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Form SF298 Citation Data

Report Date ("DD MON YYYY") 00001999	Report Type N/A	Dates Covered (from... to) ("DD MON YYYY")

Title and Subtitle Striking the Balance: Airpower Rules of Engagement in Peace Operations	Contract or Grant Number
	Program Element Number

Authors Perry, Richard M.	Project Number
	Task Number
	Work Unit Number

Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es) School of Advanced Airpower Studies Air University Maxwell AFB, AL 36112	Performing Organization Number(s)

Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and Address(es)	Monitoring Agency Acronym
	Monitoring Agency Report Number(s)

Distribution/Availability Statement
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited

Supplementary Notes

Abstract

Subject Terms

Document Classification unclassified	Classification of SF298 unclassified
Classification of Abstract unclassified	Limitation of Abstract unlimited
Number of Pages 93	

STRIKING THE BALANCE: AIRPOWER RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

IN PEACE OPERATIONS

BY

RICHARD M. PERRY

A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF

THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES

FOR COMPLETION OF GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES

AIR UNIVERSITY

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

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About The Author

Major Richard M. Perry graduated from Case Western Reserve University in 1983 with an M.A. in History. He was commissioned a second lieutenant following Officer Training School in 1984. After graduating at the top of his class from UNT at Mather AFB in 1984, he flew F-111s at Cannon AFB and Royal Air Force Base Upper Heyford, England from 1985 to 1991. Following a staff tour in AF/XOO, Maj Perry transitioned to F-15E Strike Eagles and was assigned to the 48th Fighter Wing Royal Air Force Base Lakenheath, England from 1993 to 1996. Maj Perry has over 2000 fighter hours and has flown more than 85 combat missions over Bosnia and Northern Iraq. He is a graduate of the Air Force's Fighter Weapons School (FWS) and a distinguished graduate of Air Command and Staff College. He recently graduated from the School of Advanced Airpower Studies where he was awarded a Master of Airpower Art and Science degree. In July of 1999, Maj Perry pinned on Lt Colonel and was assigned as US Military Advisor to the Commander, NATO Allied Forces Central (AFCENT) located in Brunssom City, Netherlands.

Acknowledgements

I'd like to first and foremost acknowledge my wife Terri and kids, Peter, Alex, Audrey, and Andrew for supporting me in this endeavor. Their love, patience, and understanding were critical elements to the success of this effort.

Secondly, I want to thank my Faculty Research Advisors Lt Colonel Pete Hays and Dr. Jim Corum for their insights and advice. Both are experts in the realm of peace operations and the politico-military subtleties therein.

Finally, I'd like to pass on a thanks to the professionals at the Air Force Historical Research Agency for pointing me in the right direction and vectoring me back when I got off course.

Abstract

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and demise of the Cold War, the United States has embarked on a national security policy principally focused on democratization and economic engagement. A natural outgrowth of this Wilsonian response to the strategic environment has been an increased number of operations colloquially called operations other than war. These operations may be very much like war in the conventional sense or may be confined to humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping. In such operations, the US may intervene unilaterally if vital interests are at stake, but typically, the US will attempt to garner consensus and create a multinational or coalition effort before crossing into uncharted territory alone.

A corollary and necessary consideration when contemplating intervention either in a failed or failing state is the role and relationship the United Nations plays as a supranational organization to the multinational force providers. United Nations Security Council Resolutions often set the parameters and establish the legal precedence for intervention. Yet the United Nations itself has a difficult time in defining some of these operations as either peacekeeping or peace enforcement under existing language in the UN Charter. In some cases, operations include elements of both peacekeeping and enforcement occurring at the same time. A natural result of such ill-defined operations are equally difficult and confusing Rules-of-Engagement (ROE).

This paper describes the evolution of ROE and analyzes two case studies from an airman's perspective designed to illustrate the difficulty in creating concise and effective ROE when peacekeeping efforts are occurring simultaneously with enforcement. The writer evaluates the relationship of ROE and the Laws of War and then addresses

peacekeeping and peace enforcement under the broader rubric of peace operations. Each case study is measured against common characteristics such as correctly identifying the type and nature of the conflict, command and control, multinational factors and the subsequent ROE implications. Despite a tenuous and often difficult balance, the conclusion suggests that ROE can be formulated that will fit both the requirements for strict ROE in peacekeeping and enhance the effectiveness of force application in enforcement operations.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Experience suggests that the bombing of strategic targets alone is unlikely to secure US war aims. In addition to the various internal factors that may make enemy governments resistant to such pressure, US self-imposed constraints are likely to limit the potential coercive leverage that can be achieved through future air operations against strategic targets. The US concern to minimize civilian casualties and other collateral damage has increased over time and will probably constrain severely both the methods and targets of air attacks in future conflicts.

—Stephen T. Hosmer, Psychological Effects of
US Air Operations in Four Wars 1941-1991

NATO spokesman Mr. Jamie Shea described on C-SPAN the current air campaign in Kosovo as a "humanitarian war." He went on to describe to a reporter exactly what he meant by a humanitarian war: "this is a war in which NATO provides the enforcement piece—getting Milosevic to agree with NATO demands for Kosovo autonomy and the presence of NATO peacekeepers within Kosovo--while the United Nations will provide the humanitarian relief to the displaced Kosovar refugees."[1] This statement is one of the many convoluted and confusing statements generated from NATO characterizing the conflict in Kosovo as something other than war. What NATO, at least publically, has failed to recognize is that the conflict in Kosovo is a war of attrition and not simply a limited coercive air campaign designed to compel Milosevic to accept the plan developed at Rambouilet, France some months ago. As the *Washington Post* reports:

> Officials say they have recovered from early miscalculations about the effects of bombing, and have succeeded in shifting the campaign from one designed as a swift, coercive blow to Belgrade into a long-term war of attrition. The original aim—compelling Milosevic to sign a Kosovo peace accord within days—has been all but forgotten.[2]

Ostensibly the military objective of the NATO air campaign is to degrade the Serbian fielded forces and paramilitary police units involved in and supporting the systematic dislocation of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo. The "armed intervention" by NATO into Serbia represents the first time in fifty years that NATO has used military force against a sovereign state and raises some questions over the legality of the operation. Further, what is particularly interesting in the Kosovo case is the use of airpower by NATO as a prerequisite for the autonomy of an ethnic group within a sovereign state.[3] As Michael Howard suggests below, NATO may have some legal justification for conducting an air campaign against Serbia:

> By the first Geneva Protocol of 1977, the full rights and protection granted to forces of sovereign states by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 were extended to armed conflicts in which people are fighting against colonial domination and against alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination.[4]

Although explicitly addressing Apartheid in South Africa, the first Geneva Protocol can be used by NATO as legal justification for the struggle in Kosovo whose population is 90 percent Albanian and overwhelmingly Muslim against Serbian minority rule. Yet, as Dr. James Corum suggests, building a legal defense based on the Geneva Protocol would be problematic for two reasons: first, giving full Geneva protection to minority groups or rebels would establish a dangerous precedent, and second, the claims for autonomy and independence is difficult without the full support of the United Nations.[5]

Not only is the legality of NATO intervention cloudy, the air campaign itself creates a dilemma of sorts for the US and NATO. On the one hand, air strikes are viewed by NATO as a coercive enabler intended to compel Milosevic to withdraw Serbian troops from and grant autonomy to Kosovo. On the other hand, the air strikes conducted by NATO against Yugoslavia for mismanagement of one of its own provinces have increased the stock of Milosevic domestically and have put the actions of NATO under the microscope of world opinion.

NATO in effect must be successful or suffer potentially long-term political consequences. As a result, great care has been taken in targeting and developing strict

rules-of-engagement (ROE) to help mitigate the effects of political fallout from unintended collateral damage and civilian casualties. As the *Washington Post* reports:

> Every day for at least the first week, every single target was scrutinized by military officers from each of the 19 allied nations…they looked at aim points where the precision-guided missiles were supposed to hit the target. They discussed the kinds of bombs or missiles that would be best to minimize inaccuracy and civilian casualties. NATO countries had the power—and exercised it—to disapprove of the bombing of targets that they believed would accidentally cause civilian deaths.[6]

Further, Kosovo highlights not only the importance of airpower as an instrument of political coercion, but also frames contextually the following discussion on the challenges in formulating ROE not only during war but more specifically in operations other than war. The fundamental ROE challenge for strategists and commanders alike is the same throughout the spectrum of conflict; that is, striking a balance between restraint and operational effectiveness. Yet the challenge is not only developing the right ROE it is also formulating ROE within the context and parameters of the mission. Generally speaking, for example, there is likely to be less restraint in an all out war defending a vital interest than there would in a limited war with limited objectives. Clearly, there was less targeting restraint demonstrated during World War II than in Desert Storm. Certainly technological advances in weapons and delivery platforms have made a difference in discriminate versus indiscriminate bombing yet the proposition that the United States would display the same sense of restraint when confronted with an immediate and overwhelming threat as it would with a distant and limited threat seems dubious. The key, as mentioned above, is balancing restraint with effectiveness throughout the spectrum of warfare.

Perhaps even more difficult for the strategist and commander is developing ROE within the context of multinational peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. Since the demise of the Cold War, these operations other than war conducted under the leadership of the United Nations have become a growth industry and are likely to involve many nations. The addition of several or more nations participating in UN peace operations which include both peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions often brings with it different perspectives on ROE and what constitutes, for example, hostile intent or a hostile act. Additionally, some crisis like Bosnia and the Kurdish humanitarian relief operation (Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq) combine both peacekeeping operations and humanitarian assistance simultaneously with enforcement operations. The subject of this paper, s this "gray area" between peacekeeping and enforcement operations where developing sound ROE that balance restraint with operational effectiveness becomes most problematic.

The argument below suggests that ROE development can be tailored to meet the objectives of an air strategy in peacekeeping and peace enforcement roles without overly constraining, or more importantly, confusing aircrews. The keys to any successful ROE are development at the operational or theater level, simplicity, communication, and flexibility to meet changing threat conditions. Equally important for air strategists, is developing ROE within the context of the specific mission-peacekeeping versus peace enforcement political goals—and in concert with the air strategy objectives.

Consequently, ROE development is addressed at the operational and strategic level as it applies to peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations in general in order to prevent over emphasis on specific tactical platform systems and associated classification

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issues. Additionally, with the exception of the generic Standing Rules-of-Engagement (SROE), most ROE as they apply to a specific theater are classified. However, for the purposes of this paper, the analytical and conceptual framework for ROE development will be presented and discussed. Therefore, the focus of this thesis is on ROE development as it applies to airpower in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations and thoughts on how to improve the process.

Methodology and Overview

In order to address the ROE development process and offer comments on its improvement, chapter two begins by establishing the theoretical framework behind ROE formulation by tracing its evolution and relationship to airpower. ROE have evolved closely with developments in the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). Although not a substitution for LOAC, ROE does flow from the basic principles of the laws of war.

Chapter three focuses on the basic idea and movement toward peace operations following the Cold War. Both peacekeeping and peace enforcement are addressed and related to ROE development. The basic goal of chapter two and three is to give the reader a conceptual understanding of the evolution of ROE and how they relate to peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. Additionally, chapter three develops the conceptual criteria for evaluating peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations in the subsequent chapters by looking at the importance of command and control, coalition and multinational factors, and the effects of ROE on airpower.

Chapter four is a case study on Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) which began as a humanitarian effort after Desert Storm to relieve the suffering of the Kurds in Northern Iraq then transitioned seamlessly into a peace enforcement mission. OPC represents a

good example of how the objectives of the operation were met despite command and control as well as multinational challenges.

Chapter five is a case study on Operation Deny Flight (ODF). The goal of this chapter is to examine the difficulties of conducting simultaneous peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations by the United Nations (UN) and NATO and the effects on ROE. ODF is an example of how not to conduct peace enforcement.

Finally, chapter six offers the reader not only a synthesis of preceding chapters but some recommendations on how ROE can be tailored to meet the objectives of peace operations. In most cases, the challenge is merely identifying the subtle but nonetheless important differences between peacekeeping and peace enforcement and applying those to the development of ROE within the theater. In other cases, ODF for example, the challenge is creating a command and control architecture and ROE that responds to the dynamic threat conditions without jeopardizing peacekeeping forces on the ground.

ROE have and will continue to be a contentious subject for warfighters. ROE are often thought of as necessary evils in the prosecution of war. However, in this study I will attempt to put ROE into context and perspective for the reader by presenting and analyzing them against the backdrop of recent peace operations where airpower played a significant role in determining the strategic outcome.

Notes

[1] Mr. Jamie Shea, NATO Spokesman, C-SPAN Television Broadcast, 18 April 1999.

[2] Dana Priest and William Drozdiak, "Kosovo in Context," *Washington Post*, 18 April 1999, A1.

[3] An argument can be made that Operation Deliberate Force and Operation Provide Comfort were air operations in support of ethnic groups within a sovereign state. Although in the first case, Bosnia was not a province of Yugoslavia, nor did NATO intervene ostensibly to coerce a sovereign state into ceding territory for an autonomous rump Muslim state. In the second case, the US did not want to create a separate and

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independent Kurdistan despite the US desire for an opposition group to topple Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq.

[4] Michael Howard, *The Laws of War,* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 11.

[5] Dr. James Corum, Interview with Author, 12 April 1999.

[6] Priest and Drozdiak, A1.

Chapter 2

ROE Defined: An Historical Perspective

War is the continuation of policy by other means

Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*

More than most other forms of military power, politicians find airpower easy to manipulate, to employ or withhold, in the hope of achieving nicely measured political effects.

Eliot A. Cohen, The Meaning and Future of Airpower

Introduction

ROE Defined

Rules of engagement (ROE) are directives that a government may establish to delineate the circumstances and limitations under which its own naval, ground, and air forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with enemy forces.[7]

He suggests that under the JCS rubric that ROE should not specify tactics, should not cover restrictions on system operations, and should not set forth service doctrine, tactics or procedures.[8] Roach defines ROE as a subset of LOAC utilizing a Venn diagram as shown below:

Figure 1. Roach's Notional ROE Venn Diagram

Figure 1 illustrates that ROE falls within the much broader category of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). In this construct, ROE are rules governing the circumstances in which force will or will not be applied under the LOAC. LOAC is comprised of customary international law, and treaty law. Customary law is the basic conduct of nations during hostilities while treaty law is only binding upon those nations that have ratified the treaty.[9] LOAC treaty law is further subdivided into Hague Law and Geneva Law. Geneva Laws deal primarily with protecting people involved in conflicts including the sick, wounded, and Prisoners of War (POWs). Hague Laws, however, specifically govern the means and methods of warfare to include the prohibition of certain weapons and targets. Most airpower ROE in use today come from the precedent established by the Hague laws.

The relationship between LOAC and ROE is important because LOAC sets the broad parameters that ROE can operate within. Today, LOAC is described as international law that military members have a legal duty (under Uniform Code of Military Justice) to observe.[10] While ROE are the rules under which military forces can operate taking into consideration operational effectiveness, domestic and international law/policy, diplomatic factors, and national security/political interests.[11] As a result, the

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fundamental nature of ROE is both a combination and a net result of competing interests as shown in the figure below:[12]

Operational
Effectiveness

Law

ROE

Political
Diplomatic

Figure 2. Roach's View of ROE Competing Interests

ROE within this notional construct are a part of each sphere, yet given the spectrum of the conflict, from peace operations to Major Theater War (MTW), ROE can be thought of as migrating toward one or the other spheres based on the objectives established at the outset and the changing nature of the conflict. For example, Operation Deny Flight in Bosnia had far greater political constraints placed on the development of ROE regarding collateral damage than a major theater war like World War II experienced. The figure below illustrates ROE migrating toward operational effectiveness during an MTW:

Figure 3. Author's Rendition of ROE Migration During an MTW

The illustration above does not suggest ROE can migrate toward operational effectiveness only during an MTW, but it does notionally purport the idea that ROE are directly tied to the nature and spectrum of conflict. As such, and as the historical examples below will illustrate, ROE are generally more conservative (more constraining) in operations like peacekeeping and more liberal (less constraining) during major conflicts.

Thoughts on LOAC

From the early works of St. Augustine to modern theologians, like American Bishop John C. Ford, a moral code has been developed to explain the concept of "just war." The term "just war" has evolved throughout history and contains two fundamental precepts. The first is *jus ad bellum*-or the right to go to war-and the second is *jus in bello*-or the right conduct during war. *Jus ad bellum* specifies the conditions under which war could be declared and *jus in bello* specifies the criteria for conducting a "legal" war. The criteria for *jus in bello* that have evolved over time and are incorporated into LOAC include the use of minimum means to injure the enemy, the illegitimacy of attacking noncombatants, and the prohibition on unnecessary suffering.[13]

What is clear though, and common throughout the spectrum of conflict, is that ROE must be in accordance with LOAC. Specifically, the two primary operational considerations that ROE must address in a conflict are targeting and weaponeering. The use of airpower against a specific target may be legal but the particular weapon may not. For example, Marine Colonel W. Hays Parks, a specialist in international law, mentions that napalm was specifically prohibited for use in Laos during the Vietnam War because napalm has a unique signature that would indicate US direct involvement in Laos.[14] Though this example clearly demonstrates a political angle, it also ironically indicates a desire to prohibit weapons that are perceived to be less than humane. Conversely, the weapon may be considered legal but the target is not because of its status and protection under LOAC. In all cases, ROE must conform and be in accordance with the LOAC tests of military necessity, proportionality, and humanity. Military necessity limits attacks to military objectives; proportionality refers generally to the idea that losses, including civilians and civilian property, must be proportionate to the military advantages sought. A good example of proportionality not being adhered to would be the indiscriminate area bombing of Dresden during World War II where over 25,000 civilians died at the hands of Allied bombers when the stated objective was to destroy a rail yard.[15] Finally, humanity refers to the kind or degree of force that is not necessary for the purposes of war and would cause unnecessary suffering.[16]

Michael Walzer points out in his book, *Just and Unjust Wars*, that at times the perceived "immoral" use of airpower is often rationalized within the context of LOAC by invoking the principle of "double effect." Double effect justifies unintended results based on good intention.[17] Walzer addresses specifically the idea of unintended consequences

resulting from the intention of bombing strictly military objectives. The "illegitimacy" of attacking non-combatants is mitigated by this principle. A recent example of "double effect" in action was the April 19, 1999, bombing of a Serbian television station in Belgrade in which ten civilian journalists were killed. NATO maintains that the target was legitimate under LOAC because it directly supported Serbian war propaganda despite the fact that non-combatants were killed. As Walzer suggests, if the true intent was to attack military objectives then the resulting collateral damage and civilian loss of life, though regrettable, is still legally justified.[18]

How the Joint World Defines ROE

Since 1994, the US military operates under a generic set of ROE authored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) called the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE). The purpose of SROE is to disseminate broad guidance to theater commanders on the inherent right and obligation of self-defense and the application of force for mission accomplishment.[19] SROE are intended to be used throughout the spectrum of conflict in the absence of any superseding guidance from the National Command Authority (NCA). More importantly SROE does not:

> LIMIT A COMMANDER'S INHERENT AUTHORITY AND OBLIGATION TO USE ALL NECESSARY MEANS AVAILABLE AND TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE ACTION IN SELF-DEFENSE OF THE COMMANDER'S UNIT AND OTHER US FORCES IN THE VICINITY (emphasis in original).[20]

Combatant commanders may augment SROE as necessary to reflect changing political and military policies, threats, and missions specific to their Area of Responsibility (AOR). Additionally, commanders can make appropriate recommendations to change/add ROE through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff for NCA approval.[21]

The goal of SROE is to bridge the gap and minimize the confusion between peacetime ROE (PROE) developed in order to facilitate planning and wartime ROE (WROE) used in the actual execution of missions. As such, standing rules of engagement represent at a minimum a step in the right direction toward a meaningful and simple approach to enhance operational effectiveness and a common rubric for the joint world.

Laws of War and The Evolution of Airpower ROE

The historical and legal precedent to constrain the use of airpower began before the advent of aircraft in 1899. The Hague Conference of 1899 placed a five-year moratorium on the "launching of projectiles and /or explosives from the air."[22] The subsequent Hague Conference of 1907 further delineated restrictions on aerial bombardment to include "the attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended is prohibited."[23]

World War I

The Germans in World War I would interpret the *undefended* as prescribed in the Hague 1907 Conference as not applicable to cities like London, since the common perception was that a capital city must be defended (and London certainly was). Yet the Kaiser was reluctant at first, despite advice from his military staff, to initiate a Zeppelin bombing campaign against London because of the adverse historical and diplomatic precedent it might set. In any event, the Germans did bomb London and coastal cities with Zeppelins beginning in 1915 and followed in 1917 bombing London with the Riesen "Giant" bomber. The bombing of London in World War I is important to the discussion on aerial laws of war for two reasons. First, it was the first time civilians were attacked from the air despite a legal prohibition against attacking cities; and, two, it demonstrates

that in a war of attrition, operational demands and military strategy often take precedent over legal constraints. However, the bombing of London brings the reader back to the notion of "double effect" and the difficult question of whether airpower can be employed against a population center that is clearly well defended and the hub of all industrial power within a country?

Interwar Period

The interwar period further demonstrates the competing interests and often paradoxical relationship between airpower theory and diplomatic appeasement occurring simultaneously. On the one hand, in the early 1920s, General Guilio Douhet of Italy and Air Marshal Hugh Trenchard were advocating bombing cities with a classic punishment strategy designed to destroy the will of civilians and workers within the urban areas. On the other hand, efforts to ban war as an instrument of national policy in 1928 under the Kellogg-Briand Pact and prohibiting the use of airpower against civilians were progressing on the diplomatic front. The 1923 Hague Rules of Air Warfare specifically prohibited the use of aerial bombardment for the purposes of terrorizing the civilian population and explicitly stated that bombardment is legitimate only when directed at a military objective.[24]

In the US, however, even though Billy Mitchell incorporated Trenchard's notion of affecting the morale of workers in urban areas through bombardment, much of the strategic bombing theory matured around the industrial web targeting concept of the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) in the 1930s. Key to this theory was to bomb critical industrial and economic nodes in order not only to directly effect the resources of an enemy state, but also to effect indirectly the morale of the population.[25]

World War II

Despite legal prohibition against the bombing of cities as promulgated by the 1923 Hague Rules, World War II emphasizes the point that many rules and laws are either broken or overlooked when conducting a war of attrition. Although technologically limited in the war early on, RAF Bomber Command under Air Chief Marshal Arthur Harris continued indiscriminate strategic area bombing against German cities in 1944-45 *despite* technological advances in airborne radar and bombing sights.[26] The Germans, conversely, continued to terrorize British civilians *because of* technological advancements in guidance and rocket motors by using the V-1 and V-2. In both cases, technology alone did not alter a conscious decision to bomb civilians. Additionally, the US, although more discriminate relative to the British in the European theater, conducted massive incendiary attacks against Japanese cities and civilians. As in World War I, the Second World War will be remembered not for its adherence to *jus in bello* and the adherence to the ideas of proportionality and necessity, but for its unprecedented brutality and disregard for the spirit if not the letter of the law on many fronts.

Post-World War II

Diplomatic efforts again were made to stem the threat of conflict through cooperative engagement and diplomacy resulting from the creation of the United Nations (UN). The UN was envisioned as a means of making war "both impossible and illegal—impossible, through a concert of great powers functioning as the Security Council; illegal, by condemning all use of force except those justified by the necessities of self-defense."[27] Specifically, Article 51 of the UN Charter establishes the inherent right of self-defense if a state is responding to a clear and unprovoked armed attack.[28] As in most treaties,

conventions, and charters, there is enough ambiguity to allow for either a strict or liberal interpretation of the written word. The issue in Article 51 is what exactly constitutes *inherent right of self-defense* and can a state respond preemptively in anticipation of self-defense?[29]

Article 51 is important to the discussion of ROE because it frames the debate on what constitutes a *hostile act* as opposed to *hostile intent* as it applies to the inherent right of self-defense. The presence of a hostile act provides sound justification to act legitimately in self-defense. Hostile intent is far more problematic. Proving hostile intent depends primarily on weighing other contextual factors and evidence (intelligence) that would justify the preemptive use of force in self-defense in *anticipation* of an attack. Although Article 51 is referring explicitly to the inherent right of self-defense of a state, it is used by commanders today in formulating ROE in order to justify the inherent right of self-defense for an individual or for a unit involved in an operation.

Korea and Vietnam

The Korean War represents the first time US airpower was used in a limited war under a direct mandate from the United Nations to contain the conflict and utilize restraint in targeting. Korea also demonstrated the difficult balance between applying operational restraint and operational effectiveness in order to conform to an international organization's political and diplomatic agenda. For example, even though it made operational sense from a theater commander's perspective to cut the bridges across the Yalu River that provided logistical support from China to North Korea, forces were prohibited by the UN and Washington from attacking any portion of the bridge in Chinese territory.[30] Bernard Brodie offered the following statement reflecting the tenuous balance between political restraint and military effectiveness in Korea:

> Restraint as a demonstration of "goodwill" to the opponent is preposterous when we are at war with him and killing his people. It may be a manifestation of "good

faith" connected directly with some ongoing negotiation, but in such instances it should normally be conditioned upon visible reciprocity. Where, however, it is applied as a permanent condition regardless of enemy responses, we have to be clearly aware that it may be costing us a great deal in military effectiveness—hence also in casualties to our own and friendly troops.[31]

Even with the support of Washington, General George E. Stratemeyer, the Far East Air Forces (FEAF) commander, could not get authorization from the UN on the "hot pursuit" of enemy aircraft "two to three minutes north of the border."[32] The diplomatic and political scrutiny applied to Korea would carry over into Vietnam, creating again an arena of competing interests between the perceived demand for political restraint of airpower and the operational requirement for airpower divorced from overly restrictive ROE.

The lessons regarding operational constraints that should have been applied from Korea as the US was contemplating an air strategy in Vietnam were either forgotten or grossly misapplied. During the ROLLING THUNDER bombing campaign from 1965 to 1968, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara rejected the JCS plan to attack 94 lucrative fixed targets mostly located in and around the Hanoi/Haiphong area in favor of interdicting supplies along an extensive, albeit rural, transportation network. Ostensibly McNamara viewed "his" strategy as a gradual way to turn up the heat on the North Vietnamese leadership as a means to impose a political settlement without escalating the conflict or provoking external intervention. In reality, as Bernard Brodie pointed out in the Korean example, efforts to placate an enemy with anything less than a decisive air effort is more costly to the US in terms of blood and treasure. Admiral U.S.G. Sharp described the tendency of Washington to involve itself with tactical level decisions:

> The final decision on what targets were to be authorized, the number of sorties allowed, and in many instances even the tactics to be used by our pilots, was made at a Tuesday luncheon in the White House attended by the President, the Secretary of state, the Secretary of defense, Presidential Assistant Walt Rostow, and the President's Press Secretary. The significant point is that no professional military man, not even the Chairman of the JCS was present at the luncheon.[33]

However, as Mark C. Glodfelter suggests, "Rolling Thunder's failure to achieve decisive results did not stem entirely from the controls placed on it. Of equal importance

was the failure of civilian and military leaders to appreciate the type of warfare waged by the enemy."[34] Both the civilian and military leadership assumed the North Vietnamese would respond predictably to a conventional airpower strategy even after President Johnson lifted some of the restrictions on bombing targets in the Hanoi area. The leadership in Hanoi and the North Vietnamese in general, however, much to Johnson's dismay, reacted to the bombing by *not* negotiating a settlement with the US. The key point is, even if there had been a liberal policy regarding airpower ROE to the benefit of operational effectiveness, enemy defeat or capitulation is still a requirement for success. Vietnam, and to a lesser extent Korea, illustrate what happens when ROE development migrates too far into the political sphere as indicated in the figure below:

Figure 4. Author's Rendition of ROE During Vietnam

Vietnam Fallout

Following Vietnam, Jack Broughton, the author of *Thud Ridge*, commented that "ROE (in Vietnam) were a necessary evil…however, they should not be so restricting that the forces you've committed to the combat job are hurt or suffer undue losses while trying to carry out the tasks assigned to them."[35] W. Hays Parks concludes that ROE collectively were in a state of disorganization following Vietnam because there was no standardized method for either developing or disseminating ROE within the military. As a result, in 1979, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, commissioned a study on how to standardize worldwide peacetime maritime ROE.[36] In 1981, the Worldwide Peacetime Rules of Engagement for Seaborne Forces (PMROE) were developed and coordinated by the four services. Although specifically addressing maritime forces, PMROE provided a template for and were supplanted by the JCS in 1986 by their creation of generic Peacetime Rules of Engagement (PROE). The goal of

JCS PROE was to expand peacetime rules not only to maritime forces, but to air and land forces as well.[37] The scope of PROE included a clear statement on the inherent right of self-defense in peacetime utilizing Article 51 of the UN Charter as legal precedent and provided a standardized ROE template for use in planning and during the transition to hostilities.

Throughout the 1980s, PROE were tested in such episodes as the shootdown of two Su-22 Fitters off the coast of Libya in 1981, the *U.S.S. Vincennes* and *Stark* incidents in the Persian Gulf in 1987 and 1989, along with the downing of two Mig-23s by F-14s in the Gulf of Sidra in 1989. What is key in each episode is the internal friction generated by the conflict between hostile act and hostile intent. In the case of the Su-22s in 1981, the F-14s were fired upon before engaging and thus the threshold for committing was the inherent right of self-defense in response to a hostile act. However, in the Gulf of Sidra 1989 engagement, the F-14s executed the inherent right of *anticipatory* self-defense based on the fact that the Mig-23s indicated hostile intent by maneuvering to intercept the F-14s over five times.[38]

Striking the Balance: The *U.S.S. Stark* and *Vincennes* Incidents

The *Stark* and *Vincennes* stories are worth telling because they illustrate the difficulty in balancing overly strict ROE with too liberal ROE during a crisis. The *Stark* was attacked on 17 May 1987 by an Iraqi F-1 Mirage that launched two Exocet missiles at the ship in the Persian Gulf. In a Navy study chaired by Admiral Sharp, the investigation concluded that:

> The rules of engagement that were in existence on May 17, 1987, were sufficient to enable the *Stark* to properly warn the Iraqi aircraft in a timely manner, and if the warning was not heeded, the rules of engagement were

sufficient to enable the *Stark* to defend herself against hostile intent and imminent danger without absorbing the first hit.[39]

The *Stark* had picked up the Mirage approximately 43 miles out, but the Tactical Action Officer (TAO) was dissuaded in broadcasting a warning to the fighter because the *Stark* thought the fighter would turn away on its own. However, the aircraft did not turn away and the warning broadcast didn't occur until the fighter closed within 12 miles. By that time, the Mirage had already fired two Exocet missiles at the *Stark*.[40] As Admiral Sharp's comments indicate above, the ROE were not explicitly implicated during the subsequent naval investigation.

However, as Scott Sagan suggests in a *Security Studies* article, the fact that important changes were made in the ROE for forces operating in the Persian Gulf immediately following the incident indicates that ROE were at least partially responsible for the tragedy that cost the lives of 37 sailors.[41] Although the ROE technically allowed the *Stark* to act in self-defense against an aircraft displaying hostile intent, several other factors entered into the fatal decision not to engage. First, the US was supporting Iraq in its war against Iran and therefore both the controlling AWACS aircraft and the tactical controllers on the *Stark* felt less threatened by an Iraqi aircraft.[42] Secondly, and more importantly, officers on the *Stark* were explicitly told in a briefing that they were not to target suspected hostile aircraft in a provocative and aggressive manner.[43] The briefing was in response to an incident wherein an Iranian civilian airliner had been misidentified as a hostile target and nearly engaged by a US ship.[44]

Following the *Stark* incident, the definition of hostile intent was modified and clarified to encourage a prompt reaction to ambiguous warnings. Secondly, the distance from which commanders could warn and engage targets was increased. Thirdly, US

ships in the Persian Gulf would enter into a higher state of readiness if a threat were perceived.[45] Given the reprimand of the *Stark* Captain, the modified ROE, and the heightened tensions in the Gulf, the stage was set for a "shoot first ask questions later" mindset on the part of US Navy personnel.

The next incident unfolded on 3 July 1988, when the *U.S.S. Vincennes* cruising in the Persian Gulf off the coast of Iran mistakenly identified and engaged an Iranian civilian airliner. The aircraft was misidentified by the *Vincennes* crew, despite the fact it was flying within the accepted commercial air corridor, continuously squawking the appropriate transponder codes, and it was ascending not descending.[46] The question after the shootdown was to what degree did the "loosening" of ROE have on the tragedy?

Sagan argues that ROE by themselves were not responsible for the shootdown although ROE were perhaps responsible for creating an aggressive predisposition on the part of the *Vincennes* crew.[47] He suggests that there were three interrelated causes of the tragedy. First, was simply operator error on the part of the *Vincennes* crew when they misidentified the radar return despite other evidence that suggested the aircraft was civilian. Secondly, the failure to correct the second mistake led to the third cause rooted in human psychology known as "scenario fulfillment." Basically, "scenario fulfillment" suggests that given certain environmental stressors and a tremendous amount of information in a crisis situation, humans, at times, will believe what they want to believe despite hard evidence to the contrary. A similar phenomenon has been linked to the Blackhawk helicopter shootdown in Northern Iraq in April 1994, and more recently, the F-16 attacks on a Serbian convoy in Kosovo.[48] The third factor involved were the ROE. Since the civilian aircraft did not respond to a warning issued by the *Vincennes*, the

Captain assumed he had sufficient justification for declaring the aircraft as showing hostile intent. As a result, given the other causal factors, the *Vincennes* engaged and destroyed the target.

It is argued, however, that it was not that ROE became less restrictive following the Stark incident but that, given other contextual and psychological factors, the ROE did not prevent an aggressive interpretation on the part of commanders in the field.[49]

The isolated engagements in the 1980s, including the *Stark* and *Vincennes* examples, confirmed the necessity for unambiguous and simple ROE, but more importantly, indicated the critical role that the commander plays in the ROE equation through the utilization of sound judgement and discretion. As Edwin J. DeLattre comments:

> Commanders and others must be granted the authority to exercise discretion, to use judgement in the fulfillment of their duties, because it is impossible to build, or to learn, a set of laws and regulations so detailed and specific that they would dictate what to do in every possible set of circumstances. No effort to reduce matters of judgement to matters of rules can succeed because a contingent world is too filled with possibilities for us to anticipate everything that can happen.[50]

Desert Storm

In stark contrast to Vietnam, ROE were developed in Desert Storm to enhance airpower operational effectiveness by allowing the Joint Force Commander (JFC) and Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) the authority and flexibility to control the fight. In Desert Storm, the US generated two categories of ROE. The first were peacetime ROE used in Desert Shield that incorporated standing guidance from JCS PROE with heavy emphasis on defensive operations and the inherent right of self-defense. The second set of ROE came into effect when hostilities began on 17 January 1991. The wartime ROE ensured that operational constraints placed on Coalition

airpower were not more restrictive than those required by the LOAC.[51] In fact as Air

Force lawyer Lt Col John G. Humphries mentions:

> General Horner and his staff had exceptionally broad latitude in determining the course of the air campaign. Although CENTAF's target selection and the rules of engagement for air combat operations had to be approved by the JCS, not once did Pentagon officials reverse decisions from the Black Hole about what weapons to use, what targets to strike, and how and when to attack them.[52]

The success of the air campaign in Desert Storm is often attributed to the asymmetric

technological advantage and professionalism the Coalition enjoyed against Iraq without

much mention of wartime ROE as a force enabler. The ROE during Desert Storm were

designed to minimize fratricide (Blue on Blue shots) and maximize targeting

opportunities. In order to accomplish those ROE objectives, cumbersome and legalistic

language were removed from the ROE in an effort to make the rules as simple and

unambiguous as possible. For example, language such as "minimize the risk of civilian

casualties" was removed because the general immunity of civilians from attack does not

prohibit operations that may cause collateral death or damage when attacking a legitimate

military target.[53] Conversely, the permission to engage particular targets, while they may

be attacked lawfully under LOAC and the published ROE, were refused because of valid

operational reasons. For example, Iraqi aircraft that were parked next to cultural and

religious sites were not attacked, not because of their proximity to the site, but because

the Iraqis themselves had effectively *removed* the target from the fight.[54]

A critical factor of success in Desert Storm when compared to Vietnam is that the

political leadership in Washington supported the theater commander by not overly

constraining operations with restrictive ROE. Desert Storm ROE represents a movement

from the political sphere as indicated in Vietnam in figure 4 into the sphere of operational effectiveness as illustrated below:

Figure 5. Author's Rendition of Desert Storm ROE

Yet one should clearly recognize that a single event like the bombing of the Al Firdos bunker in Baghdad may drive ROE back into the political/diplomatic sphere. It is important for commanders and strategists to recognize that ROE are fundamentally politically charged from the outset and that simply understanding the relationship and balance between competing interests is a step in the right direction.

Summary

ROE, combining top level guidance with lower level discretionary power are an attempt primarily to balance two competing requirements: the need for operational effectiveness and flexibility and the need for political control over the application of force. Additionally, ROE, no matter how well conceived, cannot substitute for sound command judgement and common sense.[55] The discussion on the definition of ROE and

the brief historical overview above were intended to provide the reader with an analytical and contextual framework and lay the groundwork for the succeeding chapter's comparison of ROE with deterrent and coercive airpower strategies in peace operations following Desert Storm.

Notes

[7] J. Ashley Roach, "Rules-of-Engagement," *Naval War College Review*, January-February 1983, 1.

[8] Ibid, 1.

[9] "The Law of Armed Conflict," *The Military Commander and the Law,* (Maxwell AFB: The Air Force Judge Advocate School, 1998), Fourth Edition, 625.

[10] CJCSI 5810.01, 12 Aug 1996, *Implementation of the DoD Law of War Program*

[11] "The Law of Armed Conflict," The Military Commander and the Law, 631.

[12] Roach, 2.

[13] Louis A. Manzo, "Morality in War Fighting and Strategic Bombing in World War II," *Air Power History*, Fall 1992, 36.

[14] W. Hays Parks, "Rules of Engagement: No More Vietnams," *Proceedings*, Mar 1991, 27.

[15] Conrad C. Crane, *Bombs, Cities, and Civilians*, (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1993), 114.

[16] "The Law of Armed Conflict," The Military Commander and the Law, 627-28.

[17] Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1977), 144-154.

[18] Ibid, 148.

[19] CJCSI 3121.01 CH-1, Enclosure A, *Standing Rules of Engagement* (Unclassified), JCS 22 Dec 1994, X1-7.

[20] Ibid, A-3.

[21] Ibid, A-4.

[22] All of the important historical developments of law and airpower are contained in an article by W. Hays Parks, "Air war and the Law of War," *Air Force Law Review*, vol.32, no.1, 11-12. Another worthwhile synopsis of the law and its application to airpower can be found in an essay by Professor Tami Davis Biddle, "Ai r Power," *The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 140-158.

[23] Parks, 142.

[24] Ibid, 148.

[25] Robert T. Finney, *History of the Air Corps Tactical School 1920-1940*, (Washington DC: Center for Air Force History, 1992), 61-66.

[26] Stephen A. Garrett, *Ethics and Airpower in World War II: The British Bombing of German Cities*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 199.

[27] William D. Rogers, "The Principles of Force, The Force of Principles," *Right v. Might: International Law and the Use of Force* (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 1989), 95-96.

Notes

[28] *United Nations Charter, Chapter VII, Article 51.* The exact text of Article 51 is as follows: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."

[29] LCDR Guy R. Phillips, "Rules-of-Engagement," The Army Lawyer, DA PAM 27-50-248(Canadian Forces: July 1993), 11.

[30] Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics,* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1973), 68.

[31] Ibid, 69.

[32] Robert Frank Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953*, (Washington DC: Office of Air Force History, Revised Edition, 1983), 223.

[33] Admiral U.S.G. Sharp, *Strategy for Defeat*, (Novato CA: Presidio Press, 1978), 86.

[34] Mark Glodfelter, *The Limits of Airpower: The American Bombing of North Vietnam,* (New York: Macmillan, Inc., 1989), 117-118.

[35] Colonel Hays W. Parks., "Righting the Rules of Engagement," *Proceedings/Naval Review,* 1989, 84.

[36] Ibid, 84.

[37] Ibid, 86.

[38] Ibid, 84.

[39] Richard C. Gross, "Lessons Learned the Hard Way, The USS Stark," *Defense Science & Electronics* 6, No.12 (December 1987), 9.

[40] Michael Vlahos, "The Stark Report," *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, Vol.114/5/1023, May 1988, 64-67.

[41] Sagan, 95.

[42] Ibid, 96.

[43] Ibid, 96.

[44] Ibid, 96.

[45] Ibid, 97.

[46] Ibid, 98.

[47] Ibid, 99.

[48] Dawn R. Eflein, Major, USAF, "A Case Study of Rules of Engagement in Joint Operations: The Air Force Shootdown of Army Helicopters in Operation Provide Comfort," *The Air Force Law Review*, (Maxwell AFB: Air Force Judge Advocate General School, Vol. 44, 1998), 67.

[49] Sagan, 100.

[50] Edwin J. DeLattre, "Police Discretion: The Limits of law Enforcement," *The World & I* 4.1 (January, 1989), 564.

[51] Lt Col John G. Humphries, USAF, "Operations Law and the Rules of Engagement in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, *Airpower Journal*, Vol . 3 (Fall 1992): 29.

[52] Ibid, 31.

Notes

[53] Ibid, 32.
[54] Phillips, 16.
[55] Sagan, 102.

Chapter 3

Peace Operations and ROE

US Foreign Policy may succeed or fail on the basis of how well Rules of Engagement are conceived, articulated, understood and implemented.

—Naval Justice School

Introduction

The current National Security Strategy, although not explicitly addressing peace operations, conceptually groups it under the broader rubric of the "imperative of global engagement," and through activities like the promotion of prosperity and the expansion of democracy.[56] The 'imperative' suggests not only the primacy and importance of maintaining US diplomatic, economic, and political involvement throughout the world, but also the implied use of military force as an enabler to facilitate, when required, the declared policy of engagement. The policy of engagement, however, is not new. One could argue that World War I and World War II represent the highest level of engagement and sacrifice. What is different since World War II, however, is the desire on the part of the US to gain and maintain political legitimacy and consensus from the community of nations as either a condition of or justification for the use of military force. As a result, since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has often been used by the US as an "institutional stamp of approval" especially regarding peace operations around the world. In many cases, multilateral action in concert with the UN best serves US

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interests in preserving or restoring peace while at the same time helping the UN establish its own institutional credibility.

During the Cold War, the UN was restricted in its use of multilateral action in peace operations when the interests of the US and former Soviet Union did not conflict.[57] Additionally, the use of military force in peace operations was carefully and judiciously applied in most cases by the US only when and if diplomatic and political efforts failed to avoid the perception of escalation. In a few cases, however, such as the creation of a multinational force in the Sinai in 1980, the US engaged in peacekeeping operations without UN support because the Soviets vetoed the effort in the UN Security Council.

Since the Cold War, however, there appears to be a temptation on the part of the US and UN to apply military force, specifically airpower, to peace operations as a preferred means to reconcile diplomatic and political shortfalls. In some cases, such as Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq, and Operation Deny Flight in Bosnia, peace operations involved both peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions occurring simultaneously. One unintended consequence of the blurring between peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions, are the often confusing and overlapping rules of engagement that are generated to span the spectrum of peace operations.

Peace Operations

Although no formal definition of peace operations (PO) exists within the UN Charter, Joint Publication 3-07 broadly defines it as "military operations to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement."[58] The implied notion in this definition is that peace is defined by establishing the conditions for long term political stability--a fleeting and ambiguous target at best. As alluded to, the UN Charter is

equally vague regarding the broader term of peace operations. However, sensing the demand for clarity given the changing geopolitical environment following the Cold War and the concomitant increase in the type and variety of UN operations, Secretary Boutros-Boutrous-Ghali in his 1992 *An Agenda for Peace*, mentioned the need for a UN military role covering the spectrum of operations from peacekeeping to all out war.[59] Yet contrary to popular belief, the UN Charter does not specifically address peace operations. In fact, as Glenn Bowers points out in a *Parameters* article:

> The word peacekeeping does not even appear in the Charter. The use of military forces in peace operations evolved out of the Security Council's desire to facilitate the adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.[60]

Peace operations is rather a US term derived from Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) authored by the Clinton administration and promulgated in Joint US military doctrine. In essence, the term has been adopted by the political, military, and diplomatic community as the overarching descriptor that includes not only peacekeeping and peace enforcement but also describes the *spectrum* between peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

Additionally, the UN Security Council uses the term peace operations to describe those cases which fall under Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the Charter.[61] Yet given the complex strategic environment, the line of demarcation between Chapter VI missions which are in theory purely peacekeeping and Chapter VII which imply enforcement, is often blurred. For example, in a case like Bosnia in 1993-94, when there was both peacekeeping conducted by the UN Peacekeeping Force (UNPROFOR) and peace enforcement operations applied against the Serbians by NATO, then the operation falls somewhere in the middle between chapter VI and VII on the scale of peace operations.

Those cases which include both peacekeeping and enforcement are often called Chapter 6 and a half missions.

Peacekeeping

As stated, the term "peacekeeping" is not listed in the UN Charter, yet the definition has evolved from Chapter VI of the UN Charter entitled, *the Pacific Settlement of Disputes.* Under Article 34:

> The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.[62]

Although, not defining the activity of peacekeeping in a formal doctrinal sense, Article 34 does give the Security Council authority and precedent to "investigate" a situation peacefully in order to maintain peace and security.

Peacekeeping, a term first coined by Dag Hammarskjold in 1948 to describe the UN contingent sent to the Sinai, defines the very essence of the UN. More recently, in an address commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the UN, Secretary General Kofi Annan stated that since 1948, there have been "49 United Nations peacekeeping operations—36 of those were created since 1988."[63] The term peacekeeping, therefore, is both a process of historical evolution and a function of the UN recognizing its own supranational role as a keeper of the peace in a changing world. Indeed, the UN has had a fairly good track record of traditional peacekeeping (Chapter VI) missions in countries like Namibia, Mozambique, El Salvador, and also its share of failures in places like Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia which were, in effect, not clear peacekeeping missions.

Traditional peacekeeping missions, as defined by *Joint Pub 3-07*, are designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, etc.) in order to support and enhance a peaceful diplomatic and political solution.[64] More importantly, peacekeeping involves the principles of consent, impartiality, and the use of force only in self-defense.[65]

Consent on the part of the belligerents is a necessary precondition for a peacekeeping mission. In fact, belligerents often welcome peacekeeping forces in order to monitor the process towards peace and reconciliation fairly. Peacekeeping forces are perceived to be objective. The notion of consent has evolved along with the changing nature of conflict. In its original form during the early part of the Cold War, consent generally meant that belligerents, typically following an *interstate* conflict, had established a cease-fire and were accepting UN peacekeepers to pave the way for a diplomatic solution. Following the UN deployment to the Middle East shortly after the Suez crisis in 1956, for example, the notion that peacekeeping forces could create the conditions for peace without the full consent of belligerents was tested.[66] As a result of the Suez crisis, the consent of belligerents often became a condition for traditional peacekeeping involvement from the very start of an operation. The UN involvement in the Congo, however, demonstrates that entering a civil war without consent can have disastrous consequences. As Professor Donald M. Snow argues, peacekeeping works fairly well when the shooting has stopped and when there is consent:

> Traditional peacekeeping was feasible because two conditions adhered before peacekeepers were inserted: fighting had ceased, and both or all parties preferred the presence of the peacekeepers to their absence. Under those circumstances the prototypical peacekeeper arose: the lightly armed, defensively oriented observer force that physically separated former

combatants and observed their adherence to the cease-fire while negotiations for peace occurred.[67]

Yet more recently, the full consent of belligerents is often a difficult and often unworkable proposition because the number and nature of operations that fall between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement have increased. This is a sizeable problem both for the UN and the US who often must commit troops to blurred Chapter VI and a half operations.

Closely linked to the principle of consent is the concept of impartiality and the use of force only for the inherent right of self-defense on the part of peacekeepers. Again, remaining impartial is often less difficult when addressing an interstate conflict where a cease-fire and clear lines of demarcation have already been established. What is more difficult is remaining impartial during intrastate conflicts such as Lebanon or Bosnia where there was no viable centralized government and numerous factions were conducting attacks while simultaneously claiming victimization. In the case of Lebanon in 1983, the US as part of a Multinational Force (MNF) peacekeeping element, abrogated its impartiality by effectively siding with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in what had become a civil war between numerous factions.[68] This loss in impartiality resulted in attacks on French and US positions that claimed 342 soldier's lives. In Bosnia, UNPROFOR clearly sided with the Bosnian Muslims against the Serbians despite atrocities committed by both parties.

Peace Enforcement

Peace enforcement, like peacekeeping, is ill-defined by the UN Charter. However, the precedent for peace enforcement is stated in Chapter VII, article 42 of the UN charter:

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of members of the United Nations.[69]

Yet the precondition for UN armed intervention in order to enforce a peace is that the Security Council first determines if a belligerent state constitutes a threat to international security. The fundamental difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement is underscored below by Professor Donald M. Snow:

For the peacekeeper, the environment is comparatively benign; the peacekeeper is the invited guest of the participants and is the positive part of the process of reconciliation. The environment facing the peace enforcer, on the other hand, is likely to be intensely hostile. By interposing themselves between combatants who have not eschewed continuing violence, peace enforcers will be an unwelcome addition by some or all combatants.[70]

Table 1. Peacekeeping versus Peace Enforcement

	Peacekeeping	Peace Enforcement
Environment	- Post conflict combatants prefer negotiations - Truce in place	- War/ongoing combat or conflict - Combatants prefer fighting - No Truce
Context	- Consent by belligerents	- Unwelcome and possibly opposed - Some belligerents may need To be coerced to comply/negotiate
Mission	- Neutral forces	- Likely that the peace enforcers will not be seen as neutral
	- Relatively simple	- Relatively more difficult, may be too hard to do compared to interests at stake
	- Traditional, good doctrinal foundation - Small, lightly armed forces, defensive	- No doctrine, controversial - Combat troops with offensive potential and firepower more robust C2, logistics and

	orientation, passive less expensive	intel organizations, expensive
Policy and strategy	- Generally noninflammatory commitment of US forces, even if protracted	- May become unpopular if protracted, which is likely
	- Overwhelming force is inappropriate	- Maximum overwhelming use of force may not be appropriate even if required

<table>
<tr><td>- No vital national interest
- No sovereignty issue</td><td>- No vital national interests
   - Sovereignty of nation may
   be violated
   - Little guidance to tell US when
   to intervene</td></tr>
</table>

Source: Donald Snow, *Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-enforcement: The US Role in the New International Order* (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, Feb 93), 21-29.[71]

Peace enforcement, unlike traditional peacekeeping, did not realize its full potential as a peace operation option by the UN until the demise of the Cold War because of the fear that enforcement might lead to superpower intervention and possible escalation. One could argue, however, that Korea represented a peace enforcement operation due to the Soviet boycott of the Security Council. However, partly in response to the changing strategic environment that highlighted intrastate conflict following the Cold War, and partly in response to a desire to exert institutional primacy and legitimacy, the UN in 1992 pushed a more robust interventionist policy.[72] As David Jablonsky and James S. McCallum argue, "it was a concept of peace enforcement that clearly went beyond the traditional Chapter VII focus on interstate acts of aggression and implied the UN forces could play a role in the domestic affairs of failed or troubled states."[73]

Additionally, UN Secretary Boutros-Boutros Ghali wrote a *Foreign Affairs* article in 1992 that called for enhancing and strengthening UN capability to "maintain peace and stability" around the globe.[74] Under this mandate, the UN expanded its role from traditional peacekeeping to full-blown conflict resolution through the use of peace enforcement. Clearly, the UN could neither fund nor provide forces enough to fulfill this larger more aggressive role on its own. As a result, Boutros-Ghali expanded the meaning of Chapter VII, article 43 to include the following:

> Member states should provide assurance that they will undertake to make armed forces, assistance, and facilities available to the Security Council not only on an *ad hoc* basis but on a permanent basis.[75]

In practice, however, what often happened, as in the case of Bosnia and Somalia, were "inappropriately sized and inappropriately armed force projections into gray areas, which could not be helped, and in fact were endangered, by ad hoc peace enforcement interventions."[76] As the table above indicates, peace enforcement is less like peacekeeping in many respects and more like a conventional war.

As Glenn Bowens suggests, when a crisis reaches a point at which intervention is contemplated by either the US or the UN the first item on the agenda is determining the type and nature of the operation.[77] The US uses existing Operational Plans (OPLANS) or Concept Plans (CONPLANS) along with crisis planning documents, PDD-25, the UN Charter and specific UN Security Council Resolutions to provide a legal basis for intervention. Typically, the US will seek a UN mandate for intervention but certainly is prepared to act unilaterally in the absence of UN support. The UN uses its broad authority under Chapters VI and VII as well as Security Council Resolutions before embarking on peace operations.[78]

The basic problem of peace operations in today's context is reconciling the traditional peacekeeping philosophy and intent with the very real combat mission demands of peace enforcement. There is a tangible difference between the two. One is committed to impartiality and the garnering of consent, the other often is attempting to compel belligerents to seek settlement through armed and often non-permissive intervention. As a result, the "graying" between peacekeeping and peace enforcement under the larger rubric of peace operations has some very important ROE implications for the application of force.

ROE Implications

The most significant ROE implication flowing from the previous discussion on peace operations is attempting to reconcile overly conservative constraints on the use of force in traditional peacekeeping with the requirement for tailored force application and associated ROE in peace enforcement operations. The very nature of peacekeeping is impartiality and the use of force is only authorized to exercise the inherent right of self-defense. In contrast, as Professor Snow mentions:

> Peace enforcers will have to be quite different. They will have to be combat troops, since they will be thrust into conditions of war. They will require offensive orientation and equipment to protect themselves in combat and to conduct offensive missions.[79]

Secondly, a less obvious but no less important implication for ROE occurs during the command and control of peace operations when there is an inherent incompatibility between the UN's role as peacekeepers on the ground and the role of US or NATO as peace enforcers in the air. This was precisely the state of affairs in both Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) and Operation Deny Flight (ODF) and the subject of following chapters. In both cases, peacekeeping and humanitarian missions were conducted on the ground while airpower was simultaneously engaged in peace enforcement operations. Consequently, the "graying" of ROE not only occurs along the horizontal spectrum of peace operations but can also occur along the vertical axis of warfare. As a result, complex and confusing ROE at the operational level can lead to frustration and even tragic consequences at the tactical level.

> While ROE will never limit the right of self-defense or defense of US forces, it is imperative that US commanders also understand the other individuals and facilities that their forces may defend. Commanders need to know if the US military can defend allied military forces, international organizations, UN agencies, and nongovernmental organizations.[80]

Semantics and terminology in the formulation of ROE as part of a multinational force is a significant challenge. Each participating nation "must have a common understanding of ROE terms, e.g. warning shots and hostile intent."[81] Without an effort to standardize ROE throughout the theater, peace operations may compromise both the concept of force protection and the undue escalation of hostilities.

Summary

Peace operations are likely to continue to define the vast majority of operations following the Cold War. However, traditional peacekeeping missions have evolved into a combination of both peacekeeping and peace enforcement to meet the complex challenges often presented by imploding states and intrastate conflict. The problem is reconciling the need to gain and maintain consent and impartiality on the part of peacekeepers with the simultaneous operational demands and coercive nature of peace enforcement. The playing out of this dilemma has significant implications for ROE to include balancing constraint with operational effectiveness and meeting the challenges of multinational participation under a set of common rules.

Notes

[56] William J. Clinton, "A National Security For a New Century," (Washington DC: White House, October 1998), 2.

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Chapter 4

Operation Provide Comfort

Combined task force Provide Comfort conducts multinational humanitarian operations to provide immediate relief to displaced Iraqi civilians until international relief agencies and private voluntary organizations can assume overall supervision

—Lt. Gen. John Shalikashvili
Provide Comfort Mission Statement

Background

On 5 April 1991, President Bush announced that the US military would provide humanitarian assistance to ease the suffering of the Kurds who had fled to the Turkish-Iraqi border in the aftermath of the Kurdish uprising against Sadaam Hussein following the Gulf War. In a statement issued by the White House on April 5th President Bush stated:

> The human tragedy unfolding in and around Iraq demands immediate action on a massive scale. At stake are not only the lives of hundreds of thousands of people, but the peace and security of the Gulf.[82]

Indeed, the highly publicized suffering resulted in the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 688 condemning the Iraqi oppression of the Kurds and requesting worldwide humanitarian aid for the Kurds.[83] As a result of the international interest in creating a safe haven for the Kurds against Iraqi aggression, in the months of April and May 1991, over 31,000 troops deployed from 13 nations to support a single humanitarian effort.[84]

The establishment of Combined Task Force-Provide Comfort (CTF-PC) and the integration of multinational forces into a coalition under the auspices of UN Security Council Resolution 688 took place on 16 April 1991. Resolution 688 placed Operation Provide Comfort in the context of post Gulf War US/Coalition and UN operations. As a result, command and control of the operation reflected close coordination between military and humanitarian tasks. Consequently, CTF subordinate elements included a Combined Air Task Force (CAF), Joint Task Force Alpha (JTF-A), Joint Task Force Bravo (JTF-B), a Civil Affairs Brigade and the Combined Support Command. US Navy Task Forces 60 and 61 were also tasked to provide support to the CTF.[85]

The CTF coalition forces were responsible for executing two primary tasks: provide humanitarian relief to the Kurds, eventually turning the mission over to the UN and other relief agencies; and provide security in the area of operations for the relief effort and during the repatriation of Kurds to their homes in northern Iraq.

Peacekeeping or Peace Enforcement?

The UN Security Council in passing Resolution 688 hoped to provide humanitarian assistance to the Kurds in southern Turkey without having to resort to armed coalition intervention in northern Iraq. The initial concept of operations in early April 1991 called for humanitarian airdrops to Kurds located in the mountains of southern Turkey.[86] The resolution condemned the repression of Iraqi civilian population but stopped short of authorizing the use of force under Chapter VII of the UN charter. In fact, as Jane Stromseth argues, " it was not even clear that the UN even contemplated using military force when it debated passage of the resolution."[87] The hope on the part of the UN was to contain the problem within the borders of Turkey and pursue a Chapter VI

humanitarian mission. However, the Turks were not overly receptive to the idea of several hundred thousand refugees crossing into their territory. As a result, Turkish Prime Minister Turget Ozal was the first to suggest that enclaves or safe havens along the border with Turkey be created in order to protect Kurdish refugees from Iraqi aggression.[88]

Although starting as a humanitarian peacekeeping relief operation, OPC transitioned under the broad guidance of UN Security Council Resolution 688 and pressure from Washington into a peace enforcement mission. Both the UN and the political leadership of the coalition realized that the resettlement of the Kurds into a protected security zone was the only feasible solution to the crisis. Consequently, on 10 April 1991, the US delivered a message to the Iraqi diplomatic delegation in Washington stating that there would be no fixed or rotary wing air activity north of the 36th parallel.[89]

Over the next several weeks, JTF-B, commanded by Maj. Gen. Jay Garner, began the process of establishing a security perimeter around the Kurdish refugees and erecting camps. While Saadam Hussein was willing to let UN agencies and peacekeepers into northern Iraq, he was unwilling to allow coalition military intervention. Yet the question of whether Saadam's proclamation constituted consent is academic following his attacks against the Kurds immediately following the Gulf War. What was clear was the fact that humanitarian efforts conducted by the UN on the ground in northern Iraq would be enforced through the use of coalition force both on the ground and in the air.

The dynamic relationship between what the UN authorizes via a Security Council Resolution and how the US interprets the Resolution in terms of implementation is an interesting question and food for further research. Suffice to say, the US may interpret

peace operations generally in the context of enforcement when security issues and its interests are at stake. Creating the exclusion zones in Northern Iraq and establishing a No-Fly Zone (NFZ) was in effect how the US interpreted its mission under Resolution 688 which stated explicitly that:

> The Secretary General use all the resources at his disposal…to address urgently the critical needs of the refugees and displaced Iraqi population.[90]

Additionally, Professor Snow argues that the importance of the exclusion zones, "now also in effect in Southern Iraq to protect Shiites and enforced by Allied air rather than ground forces, is that its existence and continuation are in direct violation of Iraqi sovereignty."[91] Therefore, Saadam was compelled to accept *de facto* coalition intervention through the credible use of force that negated any need for consent or impartiality. Operation Provide Comfort was clearly an act of peace enforcement despite its humanitarian overtures.

Command and Control Factors: Influence on ROE

OPC, it could be debated, represented not only the blurring of peacekeeping with peace enforcement but also the dynamic alluded to above between what the UNSCR "authorizes" and how nations interpret peace operations. One thing is apparent though, OPC is a good example of how the blurring between missions can be minimized through robust command and control. Clearly established command and control and the corresponding separation of tasks appropriate to a specific Joint Task Force helped keep the missions separate and the ROE straightforward. Generally speaking, the ROE during OPC balanced the political desire for restraint in order to facilitate the humanitarian effort

with the military's requirement of force protection and flexible response to a given Iraqi threat.

The specific ROE governing OPC from 1991 to 1994 were listed in United States European Command Operational Plan (USEUCOM OPLAN) 91-7. Most of the ROE were derived directly from JCS SROE and its classified appendices governing specific air, land, and sea considerations. Additional ROE guidance were promulgated as required by the CTF commander given changes in the threat condition or to establish clear guidance for airstrikes within the Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR).[92] For example, in April of 1992, the CTF commander wanted to avoid the perception of being unduly provocative so he emphasized restraint by centralizing ROE control. In this case:

> Aircrews could use force without higher approval only when absolutely necessary to protect themselves. Otherwise, they were to report the incident to the command element on AWACS aircraft, which would then contact commanders on the ground at Incirlik for authority to engage the target.[93]

Conversely, in response to Iraq's massing of troops and no-fly incursions in northern Iraq in 1992 and throughout 1993, the ROE emphasis changed to include language authorizing the use of force if confronted with a credible threat.[94] In fact, aircrews could engage Iraqi airborne targets who had violated the 36th parallel without Airborne Warning and Control/System (AWACS) authorization once the Iraqi's had shown *de facto* hostile intent by illuminating coalition aircraft from their surface-to-air (SAM) sites.[95] As a result of less restrictive ROE, several Iraqi SA-3 sites were engaged by coalition air in the fall of 1993 after the sites had repeatedly "locked up" fighters operating north of the 36th parallel.[96] By the end of OPC in 1996, there were over 40 incidents in which coalition aircraft returned fire on Iraq SAM or antiaircraft batteries (AAA) that had committed hostile acts.[97]

In 1994, however, Iraq altered its aggressive engagement strategy and attempted to assert its position in the world community as a victim of US and coalition economic sanctions. The result in the Operation Provide Comfort Tactical Area of Responsibility was significantly less air activity and Iraqi SAM radar tracking of coalition aircraft. The relatively robust ROE used during 1992 and 1993, however, remained in effect until April 1994 when two US Army Blackhawk helicopters were destroyed in northern Iraq by two US F-15 fighters stationed at Incirlik AB, Turkey.

The Blackhawk fratricide incident is often argued as a clear indication of confusing ROE and a command and control failure. The argument asserts that the ROE were out of date and not tailored enough by the CTF and Combined Forces Air Commander (CFAC) to discriminate between fast-movers and helicopters.[98] An operational assessment team appointed by Deputy Commander in Chief of USEUCOM four days following the incident found that "CTF's airspace control order (ACO) was outdated, confusing, and issuing incorrect guidance to aircrews."[99] Additionally, specific ROE governing the intercept of helicopters did not exist. Aircrews used the same procedures and identification techniques as they did for fixed-wing aircraft. Clearly, the fratricide incident indicated some systemic problems both organizationally at the operational level and during tactical execution in the TAOR. However, with the exception of not tailoring identification procedures for helicopters and the CTF not providing updated ACO guidance, ROE during OPC correctly reflected the political and military intent on the use of force. The problem was more a function of bad communication up and down the chain than it was bad ROE.

Following the shootdown, however, ROE were modified to reflect the lower threat status to forces in the TAOR and remained in effect until the fall of 1996. In all cases, the CTF commander retained the authority to authorize the use of force.[100] OPC ended in December, 1996, and Operation Northern Watch was established on 1 Jan 1997 to enforce the no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel.

Overall, the operational command and control during OPC, though not perfect, facilitated the accomplishment of mission objectives. By recognizing the importance in guiding both the protection and execution of force simultaneously in the TAOR, CTF was able to tailor ROE to meet both the humanitarian and enforcement requirements for nearly 5 years.

ROE: Facilitating Airpower

ROE facilitated the deterrent use of airpower during OPC by utilizing a combination of centralized command and control and decentralized execution given the changing threat conditions within the TAOR. Coalition airpower was used both to provide humanitarian relief to the Kurdish refugees and as a mechanism to deter Iraqi forces from attacking the safe areas. Coalition air forces, comprising US, French, and British assets used both restraint and the measured application of force when required to keep Iraq contained.

ROE provided higher level USEUCOM and CTF guidance to aircrews on what response was appropriate given a set of threat indicators and conditions. In the absence of a direct threat, aircrews were required as a rule to operate with the utmost restraint. Generally, aircrews could only engage an airborne threat if it had been declared hostile, positively identified as hostile through a combination of electronic and visual means, and

authority granted by the CTF. As previously mentioned, authority to engage a hostile aircraft during the early stages of OPC was vested in the CTF who would typically pass it to the Combined Forces Air Commander mission controller on AWACS. Yet, ROE also permitted aircrews to engage a positively identified threat in self-defense anytime without approval from CTF.[101]

As the threat picture changed throughout 1993 and later in 1996 following Iraqi acts of aggression, ROE guidance facilitated the use of coalition airpower both against Iraqi airborne and air defense ground targets. The ROE allowed aircrews to engage any Iraqi aircraft flying north of the 36th parallel once positive identification had been made without CTF approval.[102] Strike aircraft, including F-15Es and F-16s, could drop their weapons only as part of a pre-approved, preplanned mission or in response to a surface-to-air threat under the rubric of self-defense. In both cases, only the CTF or designated CFAC airborne commander could authorize release. Additionally, all ground targets required positive visual identification (with the exception of High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) shots against SAM radars) before release and run-ins adjusted to minimize collateral damage.[103]

Similarly, tight ROE was not limited to OPC operations. Airpower in the form of cruise missiles has been used several times by the US National Command Authority (NCA) in retaliation for Iraqi aggression or failure to comply with UN weapons inspections. The first use of cruise missiles was in June 1993 following Iraq's complicity in the assassination attempt against President Bush. Over 23 cruise missiles were fired at the headquarters of the Iraqi secret police in Baghdad.[104] In 1996, the US launched 27 cruise missiles against targets in southern Iraq in retaliation for Iraq forces assisting a

Kurdish faction capture the city of Irbil in northern Iraq.[105] In these cases, specific ROE were established by the NCA and United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) in coordination with USEUCOM to ensure minimum risk to civilians and collateral damage.

In sum, ROE enhanced the use of airpower's deterrent and coercive capability within the OPC TAOR and the theater. Through the measured and balanced application of ROE, airpower was able to provide and protect humanitarian relief efforts and effectively apply force against Iraqi aggression. As noted above, although not perfect, the ROE generated by USEUCOM and the CTF commander did not overly restrain the use of airpower, and in most cases, facilitated its success in a politically charged multinational theater of operations.

Coalition and Multinational Factors

Although 13 nations participated in OPC, the preponderance of forces both on the ground and in the air were US, British and French. Some nations, such as Germany, dedicated either small quantities of lift or battalion-sized or smaller contingents to help care for and protect the Kurds. Operating under the auspices of UNSC Resolution 688 and the consensus of most nations around the world, the coalition *in toto* enjoyed a level of solidarity and purpose necessary to sustain a peace enforcement operation following the Gulf War. However, multinational peace enforcement operations can be a duel edged sword. On the one hand, coalition participation is a prerequisite for gaining and maintaining diplomatic and political legitimacy for the operation, yet, on the other hand, diverse nations bring not only diversity to the fight, but also national agendas and separate ROE.

The British contingent on the ground, for example, initially deployed without heavy fire support units because the operation was originally classified as a humanitarian one by the UN.[106] British national ROE precluded the deployment of artillery battalions into northern Iraq because the mission was declared as humanitarian. However, when Iraq began to threaten the safe havens, the British government allowed the deployment of 105mm howitzers into theater.[107]

Additionally, Turkish ROE prevented the deployment and the firing of coalition artillery into northern Iraq from positions within Turkey.[108] In contrast, USEUCOM ROE permitted artillery to engage hostile Iraqi forces when required in self-defense from positions within northern Iraq.[109]

The French contingent also arrived in theater without organic fire support. As a result, the CTF had to create a robust fire support system for the French using coalition air until British 105mm howitzers arrived in theater. The French also operated under more restrictive ROE than those established by CTF. French infantry platoons could engage the enemy in self-defense but could not assist in aiding a coalition partner's forces under attack.[110]

The difficulties encountered on the ground because of more restrictive national ROE were not echoed in the air. Coalition air assets were under the operational control of OPC CFAC located at Incirlik AB, with the exception of US Army helicopters operating from Diyarbakir and Zakho in Turkey which were placed under the JTF-B commander.[111] British and French assets were used primarily for reconnaissance throughout the TAOR, while US aircraft made up the overwhelming majority of lift, refueling, and shooters. As a result, coalition air during OPC used USEUCOM and CTF ROE.

Summary

Ostensibly, OPC began as a humanitarian peacekeeping operation to ease the suffering of Kurdish refugees under UNSC Resolution 688. However, with Turkey refusing to open its borders to hundreds and thousands of Kurds, the operation shifted to the enforcement of safe havens in northern Iraq. Command and control successfully identified the nature of the mission, and assigned clear objectives and tasks for separate JTFs operating under the command of CTF.   ROE reflected both the successful command and control structure and the ability of the CTF commander to modify ROE given changes in the threat environment. The Blackhawk shootdown is less a condemnation of bad or unclear ROE and more a testimony to the problematic nature of communication within a joint/coalition force. ROE facilitated the success of airpower in the TAOR by incorporating and balancing both restraint with the measured application of force when required. Finally, standardizing ROE in multinational coalition operations were and will continue to be a significant challenge. In this regard, OPC portends the difficulties encountered by NATO and UN forces in Bosnia.

Notes

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[91] Snow, 9.

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[93] James O. Tubbs, Maj, USAF, "Beyond Gunboat Diplomacy: Forceful Applications of Airpower in Peace Enforcement Operations," *School of Advanced Airpower Studies Thesis*, (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1997), 23.

[94] Ibid, 23.

[95] United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) Official History (Maxwell AFB: Air Force Historical Research Agency, April 1994 (Secret)) ,483, excerpts are unclassified and are originally from form Maj. Gen. Andrus Aircraft Accident Investigation Board Vols 1 and 2 (SD IV-426 and SD IV-427), Aug 94.

[96] "Iraq: US Planes Hit Missile Battery," *Facts on File Yearbook*, 1993, 622.

[97] Tubbs, 19.

[98] Eflein, 61-74.

[99] USAFE Official Histroy (Secret), p.486. Information used is unclassified.

[100] Ibid, 501. Information used is unclassified.

[101] Eflein, 61-63, Tubbs 23., USAFE Official Histroy (Secret), pp.482-83. Information used is unclassified and generic.

[102] Ibid, above sources.

[103] Major Douglas J. Reynolds, USAF, 492FS 48FW F-15E Weapon Systems Officer Deployed to Operation Provide Comfort, Incirlik AB, 1993, interview with the author, 12 Mar 99.

[104] "US Missile attack targets Iraqi Intelligence Agency; Baghdad Raid Retaliates for Bush Death Plot," *Facts on File yearbook, 1993,* 481.

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[106] John P. Cavanaugh, "Operation Provide Comfort: A Model for Future NATO Operations," (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1992), 22.

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Chapter 5

Operation Deny Flight (ODF)

As Bosnia indicated, NATO cannot respond to a crisis without US leadership

—General Wesley Clark, USEUCOM, 17 March ,1999

Background

Yugoslavia imploded in June of 1991 when the republics of Croatia and Slovenia declared independence from the Yugoslavia Federation forestalling Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic's desire for a "Greater Serbia."[112]   The violent collapse of Yugoslavia into nationalist regimes led not only to tremendous suffering on the part of Bosnians but also presented a significant challenge to the western security apparatus. Since the crisis fell in Europe's "backyard," it was incumbent on NATO, the European Community (EC), and the UN to formulate an effective response to Balkan disintegration. NATO, enjoying a short-lived "peace dividend" following the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, would now have to successfully address a potential threat to Southern European stability or face losing credibility as an effective European security mechanism. However, as the complex crisis unfolded over the next several years, neither the UN nor NATO were willing to commit the force required either to ease the suffering or compel a general cease fire through the application of force. Not until the late summer of 1995, when the Bosnian Muslims were heavily rearmed on the ground, and robust

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airstrikes conducted during Operation Deliberate Force, did the Serb leadership agree to a cease-fire.

Peacekeeping or Peace Enforcement?

Recognizing the volatile nature of the impending crisis, the UN and the EC attempted to use diplomacy to diffuse the fighting between Serbs and Croats in 1991, and again in 1992. Yugoslavia accepted European mediation under the EC's threat to cut off over one billion dollars in aid.[113] However, in Croatia the Yugoslavian People's Army (JNA), protecting ethnic minority Serbs, waged a military campaign to gain control over the *Krajina* region of Croatia. This war ended in January 1992, with a shaky truce agreement brokered by UN special envoy Cyrus Vance and the creation of a UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) charged with peacekeeping under Chapter VI and the mandate of UN Security Resolution 743. The UN planned to position a 10,000 member peacekeeping force along the Serb-Croat combat lines in *Krajina* rather than along the pre-war borders.[114] Additionally, the US wanted to make an addendum to UNSC Resolution 743 to include a statement from Chapter VII concerning the use of economic sanctions and the application of force if Yugoslavia did not comply with the peacekeeping terms. However, the US effort in the UN was rejected by India and other countries in the General Assembly.[115]

The peacekeeping effort was not working. Serbia (and Croatia) routinely violated the terms of the agreement in Croatia and in Bosnia. As a result, in the summer of 1992, the UN Security Council attempted to compel Serbia to peace by enacting a series of economic sanctions and extending UNPROFOR's mandate to take all measures necessary to deliver humanitarian aid to Bosnia.[116] UN Resolution 757, 30 May 1992, stated:

> The Council condemns the failure of the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to take effective measures to fulfil the requirements of Resolution 752 (1992), and decides under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to impose comprehensive mandatory sanctions on that country.[117]

The UN was walking a fine line between peacekeeping and enforcement following Resolution 757. UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali was concerned that the implied use of force would endanger the UN peacekeeper's on the ground. As tensions between the warring factions increased and as the harassment of UN convoys continued, the inevitable use of force on the part of peacekeepers in self-defense against the Serbs would clearly jeopardize the principle of impartiality.

As the threat of violence increased against UN peacekeepers, President George Bush proposed the establishment of a no-fly zone (NFZ) to mitigate the use of Serbian airpower against Croat villages. As a result, direct UN and NATO cooperation began when the UN issued Security Resolution 781 on 9 Oct 1992.[118] The Resolution banned all military flight operations over Bosnia, and NATO activated Operation Sky Watch to enforce the NFZ. The Resolution, although a cooperative effort between the UN and NATO, was a paper tiger. Over a six-month period, there were several hundred no-fly violations and continued acts of aggression by all belligerents (Serbian, Bosnian Muslim, Croatian throughout Croatia and Bosnia.

Consequently, the UN and NATO attempted to put some teeth into enforcing the NFZ over Bosnia-Herzegovina by passing UNSC Resolution 816 which banned all flights not directly authorized by the UN.[119] Operation Sky Watch became Operation Deny Flight in March 1993. UNSC Resolution 816 led to a North Atlantic Council (NAC) decision on 8 April 1993 to enforce the NFZ ban on flights.[120] The NAC decision

resulted in the development of OPLAN 40101, Operation Deny Flight. The mission of Deny Flight as established in 40101 was threefold:

1.) Conduct aerial monitoring and enforce compliance with UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 816, which bans flights by fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft in the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina

2) To provide Close Air Support (CAS) to UN troops on the ground at the request of, and controlled by, United Nations forces under the provisions of UNSCRs 836, 958, and 981.

3) To conduct, after request by and in coordination with the UN, approved air strikes against designated targets threatening the security of the UN-declared safe areas.[121]

Over the next two years, both the UN and NATO would struggle over attempting to find a balance between non-provocative peacekeeping and peace enforcement of the NFZ and monitoring weapons exclusion zones around several large cities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The inability to separate the two missions contributed to a general feeling by the world press and political leadership in Washington that both the UN and NATO were ill-equipped and unprepared to handle such a complex crisis. With the UN intent on maintaining a degree of impartiality in a crisis fraught with ethnic partisanship and tremendous political scrutiny from the US and Europe, along with NATO's inability to act because of UN restraints, the conflict became mired in a "do-nothing" approach. As a result, thousands of civilians, in places like Sarajevo, Mostar, Gorazde, Bihac, and Srebrenica were displaced, terrorized, and killed while UN and NATO forces stood by.[122] Srebrenica in particular, where over 5000 Bosnian Muslims were killed over a two month period in 1995, was the straw that broke the camel's back. Clearly the lines between what is peacekeeping and what is peace enforcement were blurred during ODF. NATO was ineffectual as a peace enforcement coercive mechanism until Operation Deliberate

Force in September 1995. The primary reason for NATO's inability to apply coercion against the Bosnian Serbs and Milosevic was the UN's desire to maintain legitimacy for and control over the crisis in which they had a vested interest in peacekeeping. Similar to the crisis in Lebanon in 1983, once impartiality is compromised, either solid enforcement or withdrawal is the preferred political and military options. Professor Snow highlights the underlying difficulty in Bosnia:

> The danger is in thinking peacekeeping forces can be inserted into peace-enforcement situations; that somehow the situations represent a lineal extension of one another. Peace enforcement requires, as argued, very different forces qualitatively and quantitatively than does peacekeeping. The result of confusing roles and forces has been most evident in the placing of the UNPROFOR peacekeepers in a war zone in Sarajevo, where peacekeepers were placed in a peace-enforcement situation and have proven unsurprisingly not to be up to a task for which they are unprepared.[123]

Command and Control Factors: Influence on ROE

Since ODF was both a UN and NATO operation, the command and control reflected in theory a parallel structure, but in practice, the UN retained the final approval authority for the use of force because of the potential threat to UN troops held as "human shield" hostages on the ground. The UN Secretary General appointed a Special Representative to the former Yugoslavia (SGSR) who along with the Commander United Nations Peace Forces (FC-UNPF) were headquartered in Zagreb. Additionally, the commander of UNPROFOR was located in Sarajevo. On the NATO side, the chain of command flowed from Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) in Belgium through Commander-in-Chief Southern (CINCSOUTH) and Commander Air South (COMAIRSOUTH) located in Naples, to Commander 5th Allied Tactical Air Forces (COMFIVEATAF) and

the 5th Allied Tactical Air Forces (ATAF) Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) located in Vincenza, Italy.[124]

Operation Deny Flight is perhaps best known for its "Dual Key" approach to command and control. The Dual Key process required appropriate approval from both NATO military commanders and UN chain of command before any weapons release could be authorized.[125] For example, the UN Secretary General retained approval authority for the use of Close Air Support (CAS), but on the NATO side, CAS could be approved by the CAOC director in Vincenza. The incongruous nature of the approval chain within the dual key architecture led to incidents within the AOR whereby either the approval for weapons release came too late or approval was never granted. In one such example, a French Tactical Air Control Party (TAC-P) in the Bihac area of Bosnia requested CAS support against a Serbian 40mm Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) attack on UNPROFOR troops. Even though there were NATO aircraft in the area, they did not receive approval to engage from the UN representative (SRSG-Mr. Akashi) until six hours after the incident.[126]

The rationale for the duel key approach resides primarily in the debate over peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The situation in Bosnia was extremely complex and the use of force by the UN or NATO could have resulted in adding to the level of complexity and the loss of impartiality. It was thought that UNPROFOR commanders who depended on the consent of the warring parties for their survival could best weigh the needs of impartiality and self-protection.[127] Yet the actual approval mechanism and geographic dislocation led to similar problems as described above.

As a result of the dual key command and control setup, ROE reflected a rather conservative approach to the use of force. ROE during Deny Flight were promulgated in OPLAN 40101 and changed to reflect the dynamic threat situation in the AOR. Typically, the Bosnian Serbs would commit an act of aggression or violate existing UN Resolutions, and the UN would react by passing another Resolution backed-up by the use of NATO airpower. Most of the language of UNSCRs were incorporated into OPLAN 40101 changes and disseminated through the NATO chain of command and published to aircrews often in the form of Special Instructions (SPINs) or attached to the CAOC's Air Tasking Order (ATO).[128] In theory, the UN would authorize the use of force if a violation of a UNSCR had occurred, but often in practice, the UN was unwilling to authorize NATO force because of its stated fear that UNPROFOR would be attacked or captured by the BSA following air strikes. The ROE, therefore, supported this conservative approach to the use of force.

However, there were isolated cases when the UN did authorize NATO to employ force. The NATO air strike of Udbina airfield in November 1994, for example, was carried out under UNSCR 958, but with strict ROE on what could be targeted.[129] In other cases, to include the F-16 engagement of Serbian ground attack aircraft in February 1994, aircrews complied with existing ROE by observing a hostile act and gaining authorization by the CAOC director "chariot" to intercept and employ weapons. In all cases, the ROE were dominated by considerations of proportionality, necessity, and restrictions on collateral damage.[130]

The UN and NATO would exercise close command and control over the conduct and application of force within the AOR until Operation Deliberate Force began in September

1995. Deliberate Force was just that, a full NATO application of airpower against Bosnian Serb targets within the AOR. During Deliberate Force, ROE reflected a tremendous desire to minimize collateral damage. Both CINCSOUTH and COMAIRSOUTH exercised tight control over force application not only by individually selecting targets but also by developing ROE that underscored the importance that "every bomb is a political bomb."

In sum, command and control during ODF reflected the extraordinarily complex nature and difficult balance between simultaneous peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations in a crisis fraught with complexity. On the one hand, the dual key approach can be viewed favorably by not unduly exposing UNPROFOR to Serb (or other) retaliation. On the other hand, the dual key approach to command and control was not flexible enough to meet the real-time requirements of force protection. Consequently, ROE during ODF, with the exception of Deliberate Force, tended to favor the UN's desire to mitigate conflict through diplomatic and political means rather than utilize NATO airpower as a mechanism of coercion. In the end, however, it was the use of robust NATO airpower during Deliberate Force and the very real threat of a reconstituted Croat and Bosnian Muslim army that ultimately compelled the Serbs to sign at Dayton. The question is: would a robust use of NATO air from the start have changed anything or not?

ROE: Restricting Airpower

As a consequence of not identifying and pursuing enforcement earlier on in the crisis, ROE tended to be restraining. For example, as noted above, in one of the few UN authorized NATO show of force missions against Udbina airfield in *Krajina* Serb held

territory on November 1994, aircraft were not permitted to strike buildings or hangers, only the runway, taxiways, and associated terminal area defenses.[131] In other cases, as mentioned above, Tactical Air Control Parties (TAC-P) on the ground controlling CAS missions in Bosnia were under direct attack from Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) elements and could not rely on assistance from NATO air because of either delays in or refusal to authorize from the UN. As a result, aircrews would jokingly say "it's not Deny Flight, it's Denied Flight from the UN."[132]

The majority of NATO missions during ODF were either Offensive Counterair (OCA-CAP) or "roaming" Close Air Support listed as XCAS in the ATO. The OCA missions were generally anchored to a geographical reference oriented to maximize aircraft radars on suspected Serb "hot areas" or airfields like Udbina and Banja Luka. The objective as briefed by AFSOUTH and CAOC was to provide 24-hour coverage over the AOR. Once a contact was identified as potentially hostile, clearance was usually given by NATO AWACS orbiting either over the Adriatic Sea or Hungary to "investigate." Investigation of an airborne fixed or rotary wing target meant that the radar contact would have to be visually identified (VID) by the aircrew and reported back to AWACS who would inform CAOC. Typically, most contacts in the AOR that were violating the UN NFZ Resolution were Serb helicopters performing resupply, transporting troops, or conducting reconnaissance. In all cases, especially after the Blackhawk shootdown in northern Iraq, CAOC would only authorize the "shadowing" of helicopters violating the NFZ and a transmission on UHF Guard frequency informing the helicopter crew that they were in violation of UN Resolution 816.[133] In a rare case, as

mentioned previously, authorization was granted by CAOC to intercept and engage fixed wing aircraft that were observed performing a hostile act.

In such a politically charged environment, ROE for management of the NFZ established at the operational level were appropriately restraining and adopted a conservative approach reflecting the desires of the NAC and the UN. However, at the tactical level, aircrew were often frustrated by their attempts to accomplish the mission of enforcing a NFZ without having the "teeth" to enforce it.

Additionally, the effectiveness of NATO CAS and strike missions were somewhat hindered by the UN's desire for restraint and impartiality throughout ODF. Consequently, ROE were vigorously supervised by both the UN, NATO, and even individual national authorities.[134] The specific details of CAS ROE are classified but in a generic sense ROE required visual identification of the target by both the aircrew and controlling TAC-P and authorization from CAOC via AWACS in order to release weapons. In some cases, as discussed above, command and control under the dual key structure, were faced with delays in communication and tracking down authorization became somewhat problematic. At times, in lieu of direct authorization to release weapons from the UN, aircrew under the direction of CAOC would attempt to make as much jet noise as possible, to include the use of self-defensive flares, to draw fire away from TAC-Ps and UNPROFOR on the ground.[135] In all cases, NATO aircraft were restricted to a minimum of 5000 feet above ground unless specifically approved by CAOC in order to minimize the threat from small arms and AAA.

In preplanned strike scenarios to include Deliberate Force, ROE were developed around the concept of proportionality and sensitivity to collateral damage. The NAC

approved, and OPLAN 40101 incorporated a phased approach to expanded air strikes in a package with three different options.[136] Option I targets included tactical level targets such as specific tanks, mortars, etc., that were impeding the UNSCRs. Option II targets were operational level attacks against Integrated Air Defenses (IADs), command and control, and major ammo/heavy weapons storage areas. Finally, Option III included strategic targets not necessarily contained within the immediate area of interest.[137] For each option, there were specific ROE governing the level of escalation and the concept of proportionality. With the exception of the Udbina strike in November 1994, the UN was reluctant to authorize any preplanned use of force.

With the tragedies of Srebrenica and Zepa in July 1995 as a result of BSA aggression, the NAC was able to coordinate during the London Agreement the transfer of the UN "approval key" to the UN commander in the field. The agreement also stipulated specific trigger events that would illicit a sustained NATO air campaign against Option I, II, or III targets.[138] In so doing, the NAC created a separate decision on 1 August 1995 that "interpreted" existing UNSCR mandates and translated them into *quid pro quo* force application threshold levels.[139] The specific trigger event that initiated Deliberate Force was the shelling of a Sarajevo marketplace on 28 August 1995.[140]

The ROE during Deliberate Force flowed from the generic guidance contained within OPLAN 40101 along with restraints added by COMAIRSOUTH in an effort to minimize collateral damage. Some of the restraints added included specified run-in headings and "dry passes" in order to positively identify the target prior to weapons release.[141] In addition, over 70 percent of all munitions dropped during Deliberate Force were Precision Guided Munitions (PGM).[142] The careful selection of targets and

weaponeering on the part of COMAIRSOUTH led to one of the most precise operations ever conducted.

However, one of the more controversial issues regarding ROE and operations during Deliberate Force was the requirement for "duel correlation" of SAM sites before launching any HARMs. Duel correlation is simply using more than one aircraft system to confirm a SAM site radar illumination or potential launch.[143] As a result, preemptive HARM shots were prohibited by ROE. HARMs could be launched only if duel correlation had been satisfied thus indicating hostile intent or a SAM had been launched thus demonstrating a hostile act.

In summary, both the UN and NATO recognized the absolute necessity of minimizing collateral damage, maintaining proportionality, and force protection by restricting air operations with conservative ROE. The problem, it seems, during ODF was not overly restrictive ROE, but the failure of the dual key approach to command and control that led to a disconnect between what the military commander needed and what the political leadership would authorize. In that sense, ROE were at least complicit in supporting a complex command and control process that was reflected in a sense of frustration at the aircrew level. Once NATO was given the "green light" in Operation Deliberate Force, close control of the tactical situation was accomplished by COMAIRSOUTH issuing strict ROE governing conditions for weapons release. In both cases, ROE were the primary way in which the commander could communicate his operational intent down to the tactical level and retain control over a crisis where a misplaced bomb conceivably could have tremendous strategic implications.

Coalition and Multinational Factors

ODF is probably best known for its duel multinational command structure. Consequently, ROE were developed within a UN forum determined to maintain the peace in Bosnia while at the same time workable ROE were required by NATO forces attempting to enforce a peace. The UNPROFOR were comprised of many different nations but the majority of peacekeepers during ODF were British, French, and Canadian. The US provided a separate peacekeeping contingent to UNPROFOR, an infantry battalion operating out of Macedonia during Operation Able Sentry.[144] The US was and is still reluctant to cede operational control of US ground forces to a non-US commander. As a result, the US force operated along the border of Macedonia and Bosnia purely in an observation role under the operational control of a US commander. The information the US forces collected was passed to the UNPROFOR commander in Sarajevo.

The UNPROFOR commander rotated approximately every 12 to 15 months and included a Canadian, British, and French Army General. The objective of the multinational peacekeeping force on the ground was to keep a peace that did not exist. Ostensibly, the tasks included demilitarizing UN protected zones, ensuring safe passage of humanitarian convoys, and overseeing the disarming of belligerents.[145] UNPROFOR operated under strict ROE exercising only the inherent right of self-defense when and if required.

In practice, however, UNPROFOR came under increased scrutiny and pressure by the "CNN world community" to do something to stop the bloodshed in Bosnia. In an article to the *International Herald Tribune*, former US ambassador to the UN, Jeane Kirkpatrick wrote:

> What is the purpose of this "peace operation" that ends by protecting aggressors more than victims? UN forces include many persons of high courage and dedication, heroes even, but they are usually limited to showing restraint. The problem is not with the soldiers, it is with the mission. Humanitarian relief is not what civilians under bombardment most desperately need. They need allies to help them.[146]

In effect, UNPROFOR could do very little to stop the bombardment. They had a difficult time defending themselves against sporadic attacks and harassment from all sides in this complex crisis.

Additionally, the NATO side was comprised of a variety of nationalities in the air and on the ground. Approximately 4,500 personnel from 12 NATO countries including Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the US were deployed throughout the AOR.[147] Most of the fighter assets were deployed to Italian bases, while tanker and other support assets were deployed to France and Hungary. NATO also provided Forward Air Control (FAC) personnel to the TAC-P deployed in a variety of locations around Bosnia. Some of the TAC-P were from countries like Pakistan or Bangladesh. In some cases, the biggest challenge for aircrew was dealing with the language challenge presented by TAC-Ps on the radios.

In contrast to the UN forces, NATO was deployed to accomplish peace enforcement. The ROE were developed to support enforcement by OPLAN 40101 and COMAIRSOUTH after approval from the multinational NAC. "Because of the differences in the ROE on when and how to use military force between the UN and NATO, the dual key process was doomed to failure from the start."[148]

The irony, however, is that the two largest multinational organizations in the world could not achieve consensus on what exactly the mission in Bosnia was. The UN was

either unwilling or unable to recognize the level of deterioration and destruction going on around it in Bosnia and retained an undying conviction that peace could be kept with lightly armed and ROE-constrained forces. NATO, at the strategic level, was politically constrained by the UN in attempting to enforce peace when enforcement was the correct course of action. As a result, multinational factors played into the development of ROE at the operational and tactical level because of the incongruency between the UN objective of peacekeeping and the NATO objective of enforcement.

Summary

ODF was an example of the failure to correctly identify the difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The UN injected peacekeepers into a highly complex political and military arena without a clear notion of how to keep the peace. The mechanism and authorization to conduct peace operations in Bosnia were UNSC Resolutions which contained language that could be interpreted as both peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The somewhat ambiguous guidance contained within the UNSC Resolutions was in part a recognition that UNPROFOR could not perform its peacekeeping mission without some sort of enforcement. Consequently, ODF demonstrated the incompatibility between peacekeeping and peace enforcement occurring simultaneously when the environment is clearly non-permissive. The results, as presented, indicated neither organization (UN or NATO) could do its job effectively when faced with competing interests. The command and control associated with attempting to do both missions at once clearly represented a failure. Despite the difficulties in command and control, however, ROE generally reflected the leadership's concern for proportionality, restraint, and collateral damage. In some cases, it can be

argued, that UNPROFOR ROE on the ground were too restrictive and that the UN's basic desire to remain impartial was imposed on NATO's efforts to enforce from the air. Finally, ODF lessons learned should be applied to future crisis where the line between peacekeeping and peace enforcement is very gray. ODF should have taught the lesson that in lieu of a peace agreement and full consent on the part of the belligerents, enforcement to the full extent is warranted and justified under the UN Charter. Yet the political realities of post-Cold War strategic environment suggests that the UN will continue to flounder between sanctioning enforcement (a preferred military solution) and peacekeeping (a politically acceptable solution). In any case, mission ambiguities ought to be clarified at the highest levels and not translated down to the warfighter to sort out. Consequently, ROE should not be written to attempt to balance the tenuous nature between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, but rather, ROE should be written to enhance *mission effectiveness* to the maximum extent as possible.

Notes

[112] Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War*, (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 7. See also, Leonard J. Cohen, "The Disintegration of Yugoslavia, " *Current History,* 91, no.568 (November 1992).

[113] "Yugoslav Rebel Republics Freeze Independence," *Facts on File,* 4 July 1991, 489.

[114] "EC to Recognize Breakaway Yugoslav Republics," *Facts on File,* 1991, 957.

[115] "UN Security Council Votes Croatia Peace Force," *Facts on File*, 26 Feb 1992, 154.

[116] Woodward, 377.

[117] United Nations Security Council Resolution 757, 30 May 1992.

[118] Robert C. Owens, Col, USAF, "The Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 1," *Air Power Journal* Vol III (Summer 1997), 9.

[119] Ibid, 9.

[120] UNSCR 816, 31 March 1993 (unclassified).

[121] *ODF News Summaries*, (Maxwell AFB: Air Force Historical Research Agency, 1993), USEUCOM OPLAN 40101 excerpts, CAOC-22, File H5. (unclassified)

[122] Author's logbook and notes following ODF missions throughout 1994-95. The siege against Gorazde in May 1994 was a clear violation of the heavy weapons exclusion

resolution and a prime example of how UN restrictions precluded NATO aircraft overhead from intervening against a Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) offensive.

[123] Snow, 19.

[124] Tony Cappacio, "The Fully Deployable Air Campaign," *Air Force Magazine*, 77, no.1, (January 1994).

[125] Ronald M. Reed, Maj, USAF, "Chariots of Fire: Rules of Engagement in Operation Deliberate Force," *The Balkan Air Campaign Study*, Chapter 10, draft edition (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Force Historical Research Agency, 1997), 10-12.

[126] Ibid, 10-12.

[127] George D. Kramlinger, Maj, USAF, "Sustained Coercive Air Presence (SACP) Provide Comfort, Deny Flight and the Future of Airpower in Peace Enforcement," *SAAS Thesis*, (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1996), 55.

[128] Author's notes dated 15 May, 1994.

[129] Reed, 10-14.

[130] "ROE Overview Briefing," *ODF Rules of Engagement Briefing Slides*, (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Force Historical Agency, no date), CAOC-02-01 (NATO Confidential), information extracted is unclassified.

[131] Ibid, notes on Udbina strike, 21 Nov 1994 (unclassified).

[132] Ibid, personal notes.

[133] Ibid, personal notes

[134] Robert Owen, Col, USAF, *Taped Interview with Lt Col Rick Boyd, AIRSOUTH/XP*, (Maxwell AFB AL: Air Force Historical Research Agency, 6 Dec 1995), NPL-30, (For Official Use Only), information extracted is unclassified.

[135] Author's personal notes, (unclassified)

[136] Reed, 10-11.

[137] Ibid, 10-11.

[138] Ibid, 10-15.

[139] Ibid, 10-15.

[140] NATO Gopher Site, "Operation Deny Flight," internet site: http://www.cco.caltech.edu/opdeny1221.html, 10 Feb 99.

[141] Interview conducted by Lt Col Davis, USAF, with Lt Col Gary West 510/CC, 20 Feb 96 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Force Historical Research Agency), AVI-84.

[142] *Operation Deliberate Force Fact Sheet*, AFSOUTH/PIO, 6 Nov 96 (Maxwell AFB, Al: Air Force Historical Research Agency), NPL-01-02.

[143] Reed, 10-18.

[144] "Former Yugoslavia," *DoD Handbook*, (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, April 1993), 2-4.

[145] Kellar, p.28.

[146] Jeane Kirkpatrick, "A Showdown for the United Nations," *International Herald Tribune*, Thursday, 5 May 1994, 6.

[147] NATO Gopher Site, 6.

[148] Reed, 10-21.

Chapter 6

Conclusion and Recommendations

The fundamental nature of warfare has not changed since the end of the Cold War, however, the probability of US involvement in UN peace operations has increased. The reason for greater involvement in peace operations is threefold. First, the UN has assumed a greater role in intrastate peacekeeping around the world in order to meet the strategic challenges posed by the absence of the traditional Cold War players. Secondly, the stated national security strategy of the US emphasizes continued global engagement as a prerequisite for greater democratization and economic liberalism. Thirdly, the nature of peace operations has evolved from simply peacekeeping to peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The dynamic interplay in peace operations presents several challenges for policy makers and strategists in the future.

The challenge for policy makers and strategists alike is first correctly identifying the mission and objectives. As discussed, in ODF, and to a lesser degree in OPC, this is sometimes very challenging. The UN, it seems, would notionally prefer to pursue traditional peacekeeping from a political standpoint but the realities of post-Cold War peace operations necessitates in many cases a robust response and the idea of enforcement and coercion.[149] Basically, the UN is attempting to placate both the diplomatic and military instruments of power at times through loosely worded and

ambiguous UNSC Resolutions. Consequently, peace operations in today's strategic environment contain elements of both peacekeeping and peace enforcement. As a result, ROE need to address both the demand for impartiality on the part of peacekeeping and tailored force application on the part of peace enforcement. The question one must ask after reading the ODF case is can ROE effectively address both missions at once?

The second challenge in peace operations which span the spectrum from peacekeeping and peace enforcement is creating a suitable command and control architecture to meet the disparate mission requirements. In the case of OPC, command and control were tailored from the start to meet the unique demands of both peacekeeping and peace enforcement. JTF-A was charged with the peacekeeping tasks while JTF-B and the CFAC were involved with the security and enforcement side of the house. ODF, conversely, with its dual key approach inadequately addressed the challenges of either peacekeeping or peace enforcement. It was not until the "keys" had been handed over to the UNPROFOR commander in the field and NATO during Operation Deliberate Force, that positive results were seen. Since command and control are a large part of the development of ROE, getting command and control squared away is an important piece in developing clear and flexible ROE.

Thirdly, the use of airpower in peace operations presents many unique challenges itself not to mention the impact ROE plays in influencing the conduct and use of airpower in peace operations. Overly restrictive ROE can inhibit the operational effectiveness of airpower. Conversely, too liberal ROE when applied to the application of airpower can possibly cause escalation and unintended consequences in a peace

operation where every bomb is a political bomb. The challenge is striking the right balance and communicating that need for balance to the aircrew via commander's intent.

Finally, multinational and coalition factors have been and will continue to be a challenge in peace operations. Coalition partners bring diverse warfighting skills to the table and often unique national ROE to the fight. A sound command and control structure can generally iron out many of the problems associated with national ROE, but it will continue to be an difficult challenge and a consideration for strategists. There may not be a complete fix to this problem, however, the key is to standardize ROE as much as possible and recognize where the differences fall and incorporate a fall-back plan.

Recommendations

There are several recommendations concerning the development of ROE that may be helpful for strategists given the preceding discussion on the evolution of ROE and peace operations along with the challenges presented in the case studies.

The first recommendation is **understanding** the relationship between ROE and the laws of war or LOAC. Often the two are confused. Understanding the distinctions, however, will make the development of ROE less painful to the strategist. LOAC addresses the international laws that military members have a legal duty to observe while ROE are the rules under which a military force or an individual can operate. Simply put, LOAC describes the lawful conduct of war and ROE the box in which military members must stay. Further, LOAC is fairly static but ROE can shift in response to competing influences like the demand for restraint in peace operations in order to preserve political and diplomatic consent.

Secondly, ROE must be **clear** and **simple**. Brevity is also desireable but not at the expense of clarity. As alluded to above, clear and concise ROE are important always, but more so when developing ROE for multinational or coalition operations. The US Army's Operational Law Handbook summarizes the goals of ROE drafting with the following five rules:

1 Make ROE clear and brief
2 Avoid excessively qualified language
3 Tailor the language to the audience
4 Separate the ROE by job description
5 Ensure ROE are easily understood, remembered, and applied[150]

Thirdly, ROE ought to **communicate** commander's intent. ROE are a mechanism to disseminate guidance to lower echelons on the inherent right and obligation of self-defense and the application of force for mission accomplishment. In two examples presented, the *Stark* and *Vincennes* comparison and the Blackhawk shootdown, indicate, among other factors, a failure to clearly communicate higher level intent and clear ROE to operators in the field.

The fourth recommendation combines the idea of **flexibility** with the actual methodology for developing ROE. ROE should reflect the changing environment and threat conditions in the theater. Flexible ROE are key to the changing and often fluid threat conditions present in peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions. The OPC case study highlights the importance of changing ROE to meet the threats or lack of threat presented by Iraq. Conversely, ODF indicated a tendency by the UN authorities to maintain strict controls over NATO airpower despite a practical combat necessity to do otherwise.

Flexibility can be incorporated into the development of ROE even during the planning stages. The following is a generic eight-step methodology for drafting flexible ROE:

1. Review specific UNSC Resolutions for broad guidance
2. Review existing OPLAN or equivalent for generic ROE and commander's concept of operation
3. Review the warning order and accomplish mission analysis to include adding an ROE matrix given changing threat conditions
4. Review existing treaties and any status-of-force agreements that might impact ROE
5. Review any coalition national ROE that may limit flexibility
6. Incorporate any NCA or higher authority guidance to ROE
7. Review standing ROE (SROE)and standard operating procedures (SOPs) to include lessons learned from recent exercises/conflicts
8. Build and disseminate ROE utilizing principles above/change as the mission objectives and requirements change

Although not all inclusive, the recommendations above are at least a starting point for developing sound ROE for any operation including peace operations. One further consideration when constructing ROE during peace operations is the coordination and protection of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs). The creation of a Civil Military Operational Center (CMOC) at the theater level can help at least coordinate efforts and communicate information to include ROE.

As we witness the operations in Kosovo, policy makers, strategists, and planners will have hopefully contemplated some of the issues and recommendations presented above. Though not the tip of the sword, ROE certainly can dull the tip if not considered carefully from the outset.

Notes
[149] Jablonsky and McCallum, 55-65.
[150] "Rules of Engagement," *USA Operational Law Handbook*, (Charlottesville, VA: The Judge Advocate General's School, 1998), JA 422, Chapt. 9, 9-7.

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CAOC-13 NATO Air Operations in Bosnia, Slides, No Date.

CAOC-27 Interview with Maj General Hornberg, Audio, 1995.

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